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The Resolution GameA Multiple Selves Perspective

Migrow, Dimitri; Uhl, Matthias - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2009

The notion of choice inconsistency is widely spread in the literature on behavioraleconomics. Several approaches were used to account for the observation that peoplereverse their choices over time. This paper aims to explain the formation of resolutionsregarded as internal self-binding devices....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866391

Motivational Cherry Picking

Regner, Tobias; Riener, Gerhard - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2011

We construct a simple three person trust game with one trustor and two trustees. The trustorhas the possibility to either trust both trustees or none, while the trustees make their decisionseither sequentially or simultaneously, depending on the treatment. When trustees play...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009248883

Moral Emotions and Partnership

Bracht, Jürgen; Regner, Tobias - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2011

Actual behaviour is inuenced in important ways by moral emotions,for instance guilt or shame (see among others Tangney et al., 2007). Belief-dependant models of social preferences using the framework of psycho-logical games aim to consider such emotions to explain other-regardingbehaviour. Our...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009248884

Negative and Positive Effects of Competition in aPreemption Game

Suzuki, Toru - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2010

¢ ciency undermild competition. The e¤ect of competition on the equilibrium strategy is di¤erentdepending on which class of … thatthe e¤ect of competition on e¢ ciency is di¤erent between the common value and theprivate value setting. Strong … competition leads to the least e¢ cient equilibrium forthe common value setting but e¢ ciency can be improved by competition in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009248916

Competitive Problem Solving and the Optimal PrizeSchemes

Suzuki, Toru - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2008

Agents compete to solve a problem. Each agent knows own computational capacityas private information and simultaneously chooses either a risky or a safe problemsolving method. This paper analyzes the optimal prize schemes from the perspectiveof the prize designer who wishes to nd a solution as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009248918

Impatience, Anticipatory Feelings and Uncertainty:A Dynamic Experiment on Time Preferences

Casari, Marco; Dragone, Davide - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2010

We study time preferences in a real-effort experiment with a one-month horizon. We report thattwo thirds of choices suggest negative time preferences. Moreover, choice reversal over time iscommon even if temptation plays no role. We propose and measure three distinct concepts ofchoice reversal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009248914

Satisficing in strategic environments:a theoretical approach and experimental evidence

Güth, Werner; Levati, M. Vittoria; Ploner, Matteo - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2008

The satisficing approach is generalized and applied to finite n-person games.Based on direct elicitation of aspirations, we formally define the conceptof satisficing, which does not exclude (prior-free) optimality but includesit as a border case. We also review some experiments on strategic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866442

Competition on Common Value Markets with Naive Traders– A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis

Chlaß, Nadine; Güth, Werner - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2007

allowing for competition ofboth, buyers and sellers. Naivety of both is related to the idea that higherprices exclude worse … qualities. While competition of naive buyers increasesprices, competition of naive sellers promotes e±ciency enhancing trade …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866465

Is Fairness Blind? – The effect of framing on preferencesfor effort-sharing rules

Carlsson, Fredrik; Kataria, Mitesh; Lampi, Elina; … - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2010

By using a choice experiment, this paper focuses on citizens’ preferences for effort-sharingrules of how carbon abatement should be shared among countries. We find that Swedes do notrank the rule favoring their own country highest. Instead, they prefer the rule where allcountries are allowed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009022158

Committing to Incentives: Should the Decision to Sanctionbe Revealed or Hidden?

Klempt, Charlotte; Pull, Kerstin - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2010

Sanctions are widely used to promote compliance in principal-agent-relationships.While there is ample evidence confirming the predicted positive incentive effect of sanctions,it has also been shown that imposing sanctions may in fact reduce complianceby crowding-out intrinsic motivation. We add...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009022160