We study experimentally how taxpayers choose between two taxregimes to fund a public good. The first-best tax regime imposes ageneral, distortion-free income tax. However, this tax cannot be enforced.The second-best alternative supplements the income tax by a specificcommodity tax. This tax...

We present an experimental study on the wasted resources associated with tax evasion. The waste arises from taxpayers and tax authorities, investing costly effort in concealment, respectively detect ion, of tax evasion. We show that (socially ineffcient) efforts depend positively on the...

In this paper we relate individual risk attitude as elicited by binary lotteriesand certainty equivalents to market behavior. By analyzing 26 independentmarkets with a total of 280 participants we show that binary lottery choicesand certainty equivalents are poorly correlated. Only lottery...

In this paper we study information revelation on asset markets with endogenousand exogenous information. Our results indicate that superior informationcan only be exploited in the beginning of trading. Information disseminateson the market and informational advantages are counter-balancedover...

Theoretically and experimentally, we generalize the analysis of acquiringa company (Samuelson and Bazerman 1985) by allowing for competition ofboth, buyers and sellers. Naivety of both is related to the idea that higherprices exclude worse qualities. While competition of naive buyers...

We conducted a laboratory study with a public goods game in which contributions are notsubmitted all at once but incrementally as coordinated in real time by a clock. Individualspress a button as soon as the clock equals their willingness to contribute. This publicgoods institution exploits the...