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Reasoning and Institutions: Do Markets Facilitate LogicalReasoning in the Wason Selection Task?

Budescu, David V.; Maciejovsky, Boris - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2003

A vast literature shows that individuals frequently fail to identify the normative solutionsin logical reasoning tasks. Much attention has been devoted to the study ofthese deviations at the individual level; less effort was exerted to investigate whetherinstitutional settings might facilitate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866977

A Tool for Electronic Instructions in Laboratory Experiments

Schmelz, Katrin - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2011

E-nstructions facilitates the use of electronic instructions in computerized laboratory ex-periments in social sciences. In this article I provide a set of guidelines for the installationand the use of E-nstructions.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009248895

Internal and external political competition

Hugh-Jones, David - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2009

All rulers face political competition, both from rivals within their state, andfrom other states to which their … subjects may exit. In a simple model, both kinds of competitionare substitutes. Internal competition (democracy) benefits ….External competition forces rent-seeking rulers to invest so as to prevent migration.[...] …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009022178

Negative and Positive Effects of Competition in aPreemption Game

Suzuki, Toru - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2010

¢ ciency undermild competition. The e¤ect of competition on the equilibrium strategy is di¤erentdepending on which class of … thatthe e¤ect of competition on e¢ ciency is di¤erent between the common value and theprivate value setting. Strong … competition leads to the least e¢ cient equilibrium forthe common value setting but e¢ ciency can be improved by competition in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009248916

Competitive Problem Solving and the Optimal PrizeSchemes

Suzuki, Toru - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2008

Agents compete to solve a problem. Each agent knows own computational capacityas private information and simultaneously chooses either a risky or a safe problemsolving method. This paper analyzes the optimal prize schemes from the perspectiveof the prize designer who wishes to nd a solution as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009248918

Product Quality in Scientific Competition

Albert, Max - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2008

The paper presents a linear model of product quality in scientific competition.The only outputs of research are …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866718

Tournaments for the endogenous allocating of prizes within workteams - Theory and experimental evidence

Sutter, Matthias - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2004

We present a model where compensation within a workteam is determinedendogenously by the use of a rank-order tournament. Team memberscompete in their efforts for the right to propose the distribution of a prizewithin the team. The implementation of a proposal requires the approvalof other team...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866847

Quantity Competition under Asymmetric Information withoutCommon Priors: An Indirect Evolutionary Approach

Güth, Werner; Llorente Erviti, Loreto; Ziegelmeyer, Anthony - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2004

The common prior assumption asserts that the beliefs of agents in different states of theworld are their posteriors based on a common prior and possibly some private signal. Commonpriors are pervasive in most economic models of incomplete information, oligopoly models withasymmetrically informed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866870

Hidden Costs of Control:Three Repetitions and an Extension

Ploner, Matteo; Schmelz, Katrin; Ziegelmeyer, Anthony - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2010

We report three repetitions of Falk and Kosfeld's (2006) low and medium control treatmentswith 364 subjects. Each repetition employs a sample drawn from a standard subject pool ofstudents and demographics vary across samples. Our results largely conict with those of theoriginal study. We mainly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005870900

The Provision of Public Goods with Positive GroupInterdependencies

Güth, Werner; Sääksvuori, Lauri - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2010

This article examines the nature of human behavior in a nested socialdilemma referred to as the Spillover Game. Players are divided into twogroups with positive production interdependencies. Based on theoreticallyderived opportunistic, local, and global optima, our experimental...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009022157

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