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Competitive Problem Solving and the Optimal PrizeSchemes

Suzuki, Toru - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2008

Agents compete to solve a problem. Each agent knows own computational capacityas private information and simultaneously chooses either a risky or a safe problemsolving method. This paper analyzes the optimal prize schemes from the perspectiveof the prize designer who wishes to nd a solution as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009248918

Reputationsmechanismen auf Internet-Marktplattformen - Theorie und Empirie

Ockenfels, Axel - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2002

Spieltheoretische Überlegungen zeigen, dass Reputationsmechanismen, wie sie auf Internet-Marktplattformen zur Anwendung kommen, prinzipiell geignet sind, Handel in großen anonymen Märkten zu erleichtern. Dies geil selbst dann, wenn die Marktteilnehmer ihre Identität jederzeit und kostenlos...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866985

A Strategic Selection Procedure

Suzuki, Toru - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2011

A decision maker (DM) wishes to select a competent candidate to ll a position.However, since the wage and task of the position is predetermined, the DM cannot usecontract as a screening device. This paper formulates the problem as a class of selectionproblem and derives the optimal selection...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009248892

Fragility of Information Cascades:An Experimental Study using Elicited Beliefs

Koessler, Frédéric; Ziegelmeyer, Anthony; Bracht, Jürgen - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2008

This paper examines the occurrence and fragility of information cascades in laboratory experiments.One group of low informed subjects make predictions in sequence. In a matchedpairs design, another set of high informed subjects observe the decisions of the first group andmake predictions....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866431

Asymmetric Information without Common Priors: An IndirectEvolutionary Analysis of Quantity Competition

Güth, Werner; Llorente Ervitib, Loreto; Ziegelmeyer, … - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2006

The common prior assumption justifies private beliefs as posterior probabilities when updatinga common prior based on individual information. Common priors are pervasive in most economicmodels of incomplete information and oligopoly models with asymmetrically informed firms. Wedispose of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866639

On the Absorbability of the Guessing Game Theory -A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis

Morone, Andrea; Sandri, Serena; Uske, Tobias - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2006

Theory absorption, a notion introduced by Morgenstern and Schwödiauer (1972)and further elaborated by Güth and Kliemt (2004), discusses the problem whether atheory can survive its own acceptance. Whereas this holds for strategic equilibria accordingto the assumptions on which they are based,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866646

Negative and Positive Effects of Competition in aPreemption Game

Suzuki, Toru - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2010

¢ ciency undermild competition. The e¤ect of competition on the equilibrium strategy is di¤erentdepending on which class of … thatthe e¤ect of competition on e¢ ciency is di¤erent between the common value and theprivate value setting. Strong … competition leads to the least e¢ cient equilibrium forthe common value setting but e¢ ciency can be improved by competition in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009248916

Do prices in the unmediated call auction reflect insiderinformation? – An experimental analysis

Brünner, Tobias; Levinski, Rene - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2008

The unmediated call auction is a useful trading mechanism to aggregate dispersedinformation. Its ability to incorporate information of a single informed insider,however, is less well understood. We analyse this question by presenting a simplecall auction game where both auction prices and limit...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866435

Asymmetric Auction Experiments With(out) Commonly Known Beliefs

Güth, Werner; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2002

Are commonly known beliefs essential for bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions? Our experimental results suggest that not informing participants how values are randomly generated does not change behavior much and may even make it appear more rational.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005867012

Reasoning and Institutions: Do Markets Facilitate LogicalReasoning in the Wason Selection Task?

Budescu, David V.; Maciejovsky, Boris - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2003

A vast literature shows that individuals frequently fail to identify the normative solutionsin logical reasoning tasks. Much attention has been devoted to the study ofthese deviations at the individual level; less effort was exerted to investigate whetherinstitutional settings might facilitate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866977