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The impact of payo interdependenceon trust and trustworthiness

Güth, Werner; Levati, Maria Vittoria; Ploner, Matteo - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung …

In one-shot investment game experiments where each player's payo is a convexcombination of own and other's prot, trust remains unaected by the extent of interdependencewhereas trustworthiness reacts positively to it.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866849

The Eect of Group Identityin an Investment Game

Güth, Werner; Levati, Maria Vittoria; Ploner, Matteo - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung …

The present research experimentally examines the ininfluence of groupidentity on trust behavior in an investment game. In one treatment,group identity is manipulated only through the creation of artificial(minimal) groups. In other treatments group members are additionallyrelated by outcome...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866946

Trust between individuals and groups: Groups are less trusting than individuals but just as trustworthy

Bornstein, Gary; Kocher, Martin; Kugler, Tamar; Sutter, … - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung …

We compared the behavior of groups and individuals in a two-person trust game. The first mover in this game, the sender, receives an endowment and can send any part of it to the responder; the amount sent is tripled, and the responder can then return to the sender any portion of the tripled sum....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866950

(Un)Reliable Concessions in Static andDynamic Bargaining Experiments

Fischer, Sven; González Morales, Luis G.; Güth, Werner - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung … - 2005

A two-persons bargaining problem often consists of initially incompatible demands that can be unilaterally reduced by sequential concessions. In a 2 x 2 x 2-factorial design we distinguish between reliable and unreliable concessions, between a static and dynamic settings and between symmetric...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866602

Measuring the Degree of Ambiguity about Probability: Experimental Evidence

Morone, Andrea; Özdemir, Özlem - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung … - 2005

This paper aims to experimentally investigate how individual willingness to pay for a lottery is affected by using a new way of representing of probabilistic ambiguity. Thus we can see how individual valuation reacts to different degrees of ambiguity probability information provided to subjects....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866670

Collaborative Networks in Experimental Triopolies

Pantz, Katinka; Ziegelmeyer, Anthony - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung …

. We report the results of a series ofexperiments. The first experiment is designed as a straightforward theory … symmetric networks. Collusion cannot account for the observed behavior. In our second experiment we reject the conjecture that … two-stage game. Finally, in our third experiment we reduce the complexity of the setting by transforming the original two …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866674

The Regulation of Nonpoint Emissions in the Laboratory:A Stress Test of the Ambient Tax Mechanism

Boun My, Kene; Cochard, François; Ziegelmeyer, Anthony - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung …

We investigate the ability of the damage based tax mechanism to induce socially optimal outcomes in a controlled laboratory environment which incorporates important aspects of nonpoint pollution problems. Our experimental setting combines a strictly convex damage function with uncertainty in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866677

Inequality Aversion in Ultimatum Gameswith Asymmetric Conflict Payoffs

Fischer, Sven - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung … - 2005

Assuming inequality averse subjects as modeled by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) or in the ERC model by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) in ultimatum games with asymmetric conflict payoffs allows to make predictions especially concerning responder acceptance thresholds. These predictions are tested in a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866680

Strategic Delay and Rational Imitation in the Laboratory

Ziegelmeyer, Anthony; Boun My, Kene; VERGNAUD, JEAN; … - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung …

This paper investigates market failures due to strategic delays. We test experimentally a discrete model of dynamic investment, where two privately informed agents have an option to invest at the time of their choice in the presence of waiting costs. The equilibrium outcome of ourexperimental...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866694

Laboratory Bilateral Gift Exchange:The Impact of Loss Aversion

Dittrich, Dennis; Ziegelmeyer, Anthony - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung …

The employment relationship is characterized by incomplete contracts. Labor contracts often take the form of a fixed wage without explicit performance incentives meaning that workers have a large degree of discretion over effort levels. As a consequence, an employee’s general jobattitude...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866697