Showing 1 - 10 of 24
This article is concerned with the welfare properties of trade when the behavior of agents cannot be rationalized by preferences. I investigate this question in an environment of matching allocation problems. There are two reasons for doing so: rstly, the niteness of such problems entails that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009021684
Mechanism design theory strongly relies on the concept of Nash equilibrium. However, studies of experimental games show that Nash equilibria are rarely played and that subjects may be thinking only a finite number of iterations. We study one of the most influential benchmarks of mechanism design...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011194287
Brandstätter, Gigerenzer and Hertwig (2006) put forward the priority heuristic (PH) as a fast and frugal heuristic for decisions under risk. According to the PH, individuals do not make trade-offs between gains and probabilities, as proposed by expected utility models such as cumulative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772775
In this paper I demonstrate that a reasonable welfare theoretic concept of "progress" can be made consistent with the assumption of endogenously changing preferences as long as these preference changes correspond to the pattern of "adaptive preferences". The main theorem of the paper shows that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772788
The fast-and-frugal heuristics approach to probabilistic inference assumes that individuals often employ simple heuristics to integrate cue information that commonly function in a non-reciprocal fashion. Specifically, the subjective validity of a certain cue remains stable during the application...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004991251
From the perspective of competitors, competition may be modeled as a prisoner’s dilemma. Setting the monopoly price is cooperation, undercutting is defection. Jointly, competitors are better off if both are faithful to a cartel. Individually, profit is highest if only the competitor(s) is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009021689
We study how cooperative behavior reacts to selective (favorable or unfavorable) pre-play information about the cooperativeness of other, unrelated groups within an experimental framework that is sufficiently rich for conflicting behavioral norms to emerge. We find that cooperation crucially...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009021692
controlled conditions, we have conducted a public goods experiment with central punishment. The authority is neutral – she does …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010731963
states and in British Columbia, Canada. We ran a laboratory experiment with a framing likened to German corporate law which … slightly inhibits it instead. Our experiment thus illustrates the paramount importance of taking into account both incentives …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010662709
According to Adam Smith (1790), human selfishness can be restrained by introspection. We test the effect of introspection on people’s willingness to cooperate in a public good game. Drawing on the concept of identity utility (George A. Akerlof and Rachel E. Kranton, 2000), we show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011194285