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Intellectual Property as a Carrot for Innovators Using Game Theory to Show the Limits of the Argument

Schmidt, Dorothee - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2007

One possible solution to mitigate the negative influences of conflict which has been proposed in the literature is to … increasing an individual's social capital will lead her to reduce her conflict effort, whereas increasing her human capital can … induce her to increase her conflict effort. We then analyze which conditions need to be present to induce the individuals to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772763

Morality and Conflicts

Schmidt, Dorothee - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2005

In recent debates, morality or social norms have been proposed as an instrument to reduce conflict behavior. As the … question in the framework of contest theory, we find that if morality can discriminate between appropriation and defense, it is … discriminate between these different conflict efforts, strategic effects due to a one-sided increase in morality might actually …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005612388

Mechanism Design and Voting for Public-Good Provision

Bierbrauer, Felix; Hellwig, Martin - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2011

We propose a new approach to the normative analysis of public-good provision. In addition to individual incentive compatibility, we impose conditions of robust implementability and coalition proofness. Under these additional conditions, participants' contributions can only depend on the level of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010535928

Procrastination in Teams, Contract Design and Discrimination

Weinschenk, Philipp - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2011

We study a dynamic model of team production with moral hazard. We show that the players begin to invest effort only shortly before the time limit when the reward for solving the task is shared equally. We explore how the team can design contracts to mitigate this form of procrastination and show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009226922

Binary Payment Schemes: Moral Hazard and Loss Aversion

Herweg, Fabian; Müller, Daniel; Weinschenk, Philipp - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2010

We modify the principal-agent model with moral hazard by assuming that the agent is expectation-based loss averse according to Köszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). The optimal contract is a binary payment scheme even for a rich performance measure, where standard preferences predict a fully...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008693524

Too Much Information Sharing? Welfare Effects of Sharing Acquired Cost Information in Oligopoly

Ganuza, Juan José; Jansen, Jos - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2010

By using general information structures and precision criteria based on the dispersion of conditional expectations, we study how oligopolists’ information acquisition decisions may change the effects of information sharing on the consumer surplus. Sharing information about individual cost...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008693525

Moral Hazard and Ambiguity

Weinschenk, Philipp - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2010

We consider a principal-agent model with moral hazard where the agent’s knowledge about the performance measure is ambiguous and he is averse towards ambiguity. We show that the principal may optimally provide no incentives or contract only on a subset of all informative performance measures....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008693531

Communicating Subjective Evaluations

Lang, Matthias - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2012

Should principals explain and justify their evaluations? Suppose the principal's evaluation is private information, but she can provide justication by sending a costly cheap-talk message. If she does not provide justication, her message space is restricted, but the message is costless. I show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010755388

Öffentlichkeitsarbeit der Regierung (Governmental Public Relations)

Engel, Christoph - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2005

Should government be allowed to spend tax payers’ money on public relations? If one frames the question that way, the negative answer suggests itself. Yet government communication serves more purposes. These purposes may be analysed in terms of behavioural economics and psychology. In moral...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008633206

Distortionary Taxation and the Free-Rider Problem

Bierbrauer, Felix - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2006

This paper derives a version of the Samuelson rule, which takes not only the marginal costs of public funds into account but also the desirability of preference revelation. Under a linear income tax more able individuals suffer from a larger utility loss if taxes are raised to cover the cost of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008633211