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Intellectual Property as a Carrot for Innovators Using Game Theory to Show the Limits of the Argument

Schmidt, Dorothee - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2007

One possible solution to mitigate the negative influences of conflict which has been proposed in the literature is to … increasing an individual's social capital will lead her to reduce her conflict effort, whereas increasing her human capital can … induce her to increase her conflict effort. We then analyze which conditions need to be present to induce the individuals to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772763

Morality and Conflicts

Schmidt, Dorothee - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2005

In recent debates, morality or social norms have been proposed as an instrument to reduce conflict behavior. As the … question in the framework of contest theory, we find that if morality can discriminate between appropriation and defense, it is … discriminate between these different conflict efforts, strategic effects due to a one-sided increase in morality might actually …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005612388

The Expected Externality Mechanism in a Level-k Environment

Gorelkina, Olga - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2015

Mechanism design theory strongly relies on the concept of Nash equilibrium. However, studies of experimental games show that Nash equilibria are rarely played and that subjects may be thinking only a finite number of iterations. We study one of the most influential benchmarks of mechanism design...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011194287

Precluding Collusion in the Vickrey Auction

Gorelkina, Olga - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2014

This paper studies collusion in one-shot auctions, where a buyer can bribe his competitors into lowering their bids. We modify the single-unit Vickrey auction to incite deviations from the designated-winner scenario and thus undermine collusion. The construction of mechanism does not require the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010891239

Delayed Verification Mechanism for Dynamic Implementation

Gorelkina, Olga - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2014

This paper introduces a virtually efficient mechanism in a setting with sequentially arriving agents who hold informative signals about future types. To reveal the information the principal organises betting on future type reports. An agent’s betting reward depends on how accurately the prior...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010891241

Mechanism Design and Voting for Public-Good Provision

Bierbrauer, Felix; Hellwig, Martin - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2011

We propose a new approach to the normative analysis of public-good provision. In addition to individual incentive compatibility, we impose conditions of robust implementability and coalition proofness. Under these additional conditions, participants' contributions can only depend on the level of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010535928

Share to Scare: Technology Sharing in the Absence of Intellectual Property Rights

Jansen, Jos - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2009

I study the incentives of Cournot duopolists to share their technologies with their competitor in markets where intellectual property rights are absent and imitation is costless. The trade-off between a signaling effect and an expropriation effect determines the technology-sharing incentives. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008556009

On Competition and the Strategic Management of Intellectual Property in Oligopoly

Jansen, Jos - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2009

An innovative firm chooses strategically whether to patent its process innovation or rely on secrecy. By doing so, the firm manages its rival’s beliefs about the size of the innovation, and affects the incentives in the product market. Different measures of competitive pressure in the product...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004991252

An economic analysis of trade-secret protection in buyer-seller relationships

Bechtold, Stefan; Hoeffler, Felix - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2007

The economic analysis of trade-secret protection has traditionally focused on the interests of companies to conceal information from competitors in order to gain a competitive advantage through trade-secret law. This has neglected cases in which the interest is not in concealing information from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772747

Optimal Democratic Mechanisms for Taxation and Public Good Provision

Bierbrauer, Felix; Sahm, Marco - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2008

We study the interdependence of optimal tax and expenditure policies. An optimal policy requires that information on preferences is made available. We first study this problem from a general mechanism design perspective and show that efficiency is possible only if the individuals who decide on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772748