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Selfishness As a Potential Cause of Crime. A Prison Experiment

Chmura, Thorsten; Engel, Christoph; Englerth, Markus - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2013

For a rational choice theorist, the absence of crime is more difficult to explain than its presence. Arguably, the expected value of criminal sanctions, i.e. the product of severity times certainty, is often below the expected benefit. We rely on a standard theory from behavioral economics,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010667907

Cui Bono, Benefit Corporation? An Experiment Inspired by Social Enterprise Legislation in Germany and the US

Fischer, Sven; Goerg, Sebastian; Hamann, Hanjo - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2013

How do barely incentivized norms impact incentive-rich environments? We take social enterprise legislation as a case in point. It establishes rules on behalf of constituencies that have no institutionalized means of enforcing them. By relying primarily on managers' other-regarding concerns...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010662709

Goals (th)at Work – Goals, Monetary Incentives, and Workers’ Performance

Goerg, Sebastian; Kube, Sebastian - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2012

In a randomized field experiment, we investigate the connection between work goals, monetary incentives, and work performance. Employees are observed in a natural work environment where they have to do a simple, but effort-intense task. Output is perfectly observable and workers are paid for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010584376

The Role of the Judiciary in the Public Decision Making Process

Albanese, Giuseppe; Sorge, Marco M. - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2010

In this paper we investigate the role of judicial control of lobbying activities in an endogenous policy framework, focusing on two dimensions of quality of the judiciary, namely efficiency and integrity. We present a multi-layer lobbying model where a self-interested group is allowed to inuence...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008614915

Tearing the Veil of Privacy Law: An Experiment on Chilling Effects and the Right to Be Forgotten

Hermstrüwer, Yoan; Dickert, Stephan - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2013

Privacy law relies on the argument that consent does not entail any relevant impediments for the liberty of the consenting individual. Challenging this argument, we experimentally investigate whether consent to the publication of personal information in cyberspace entails self-coercion on a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010696089

Give Everybody a Voice! The Power of Voting in a Public Goods Experiment with Externalities

Engel, Christoph; Rockenbach, Bettina - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2014

We study the effect of voting when insiders’ public goods provision may affect passive outsiders. Without voting …. Voting on the recommended contribution level enhances contributions if outsiders are unaffected and internalizes the negative … externality by lowering contributions when outsiders are negatively affected. Remarkably, voting does not increase contributions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011106491

Noisy commitments: The impact of information accuracy on efficiency

Ert, Eyal; Nicklisch, Andreas - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2006

We report an experiment designed to test the influence of noisy commitments on efficiency in a simple bargaining game. We investigate two different levels of commitment reliability in a variant of the peasant-dictator game. Theoretical analysis suggests that the reliability of commitments in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008633204

Social Dilemmas, Revisited from a Heuristics Perspective

Engel, Christoph - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2004

The standard tool for analysing social dilemmas is game theory. They are reconstructed as prisoner dilemma games. This is helpful for understanding the incentive structure. Yet this analysis is based on the classic homo oeconomicus assumptions. In many real world dilemma situations, these...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008633218

The Difficult Reception of Rigorous Descriptive Social Science in the Law

Engel, Christoph - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2006

Mutual disdain is an effective border patrol at the demarcation lines between disciplines. Social scientists tend to react with disdain when they observe how their findings are routinely stripped of all the caveats, assumptions and careful limitations once they travel into law. Likewise, lawyers...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008633235

Besonderes Verwaltungsrecht und ökonomische Theorie

Engel, Christoph - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2011

The novel part of this paper is a model of the principle of proportionality, as the cornerstone of the doctrine of fundamental rights. German law, and with some modifications also the law of the European Community and the European Convention on Human Rights, do not categorically outlaw...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009021685