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Price Setting in a Decentralized Market and the Competitive Outcome

Lauermann, Stephan - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2008

This paper studies a decentralized, dynamic matching and bargaining market: buyers and sellers are matched into pairs. Traders exit the market at a constant rate, inducing search costs (frictions). All price offers are made by sellers. Despite the fact that sellers have all the bargaining power...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005612384

Auction Mechanisms and Bidder Collusion: Bribes, Signals and Selection

Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; Ro'i Zultan - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2014

The theoretical literature on collusion in auctions suggests that the first-price mechanism can deter the formation of … likely to affect the bidding behavior in firstprice (but not second-price) auctions. We test experimentally a setup in which … collusion in first-price and second-price auctions. Furthermore, failed collusion attempts distort the bidding behavior in the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011106492

Beliefs, Payoffs, Information: On the Robustness of the BDP Property in Models with Endogenous Beliefs

Gizatulina, Alia; Hellwig, Martin - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2011

Neeman (2004) and Heifetz and Neeman (2006) have shown that, in auctions with incomplete information about payoffs …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010662710

Precluding Collusion in the Vickrey Auction

Gorelkina, Olga - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2014

This paper studies collusion in one-shot auctions, where a buyer can bribe his competitors into lowering their bids. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010891239

Informational Smallness and the Scope for Limiting Information Rents

Gizatulina, Alia; Hellwig, Martin - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2009

For an incomplete-information model of public-good provision with interim participation constraints, we show that e¢ cient outcomes can be approximated, with approximately full surplus extraction, when there are many agents and each agent is informationally small. The result holds even if...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008497630

Incomplete-Information Models of Large Economies with Anonymity: Existence and Uniqueness of Common Priors

Hellwig, Martin - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2011

The paper provides a speci?cation of belief systems for models of large economies with anonymity in which aggregate states depend only on cross-section distributions of types. For belief systems satisfying certain conditions of mutual absolute continuity, the paper gives a necessary and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009021688

Too Much Information Sharing? Welfare Effects of Sharing Acquired Cost Information in Oligopoly

Ganuza, Juan José; Jansen, Jos - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2010

By using general information structures and precision criteria based on the dispersion of conditional expectations, we study how oligopolists’ information acquisition decisions may change the effects of information sharing on the consumer surplus. Sharing information about individual cost...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008693525

Strategic Information Disclosure and Competition for an Imperfectly Protected Innovation

Jansen, Jos - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2009

The imperfect appropriability of revenues from innovation affects the incentives of firms to invest, and to disclose information about their innovative productivity. It creates a free-rider effect in the competition for the innovation that countervails the familiar business-stealing effect....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772764

Pareto-Optimal Matching Allocation Mechanisms for Boundedly Rational Agents

Bade, Sophie - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2010

This article is concerned with the welfare properties of trade when the behavior of agents cannot be rationalized by preferences. I investigate this question in an environment of matching allocation problems. There are two reasons for doing so: rstly, the niteness of such problems entails that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009021684

Matching Allocation Problems with Endogenous Information Acquisition

Bade, Sophie - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2010

The paper introduces the assumption of costly information acquisition to the theory of mechanism design for matching allocation problems. It is shown that the assumption of endogenous information acquisition greatly changes some of the cherished results in that theory: in particular, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008742970