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We Are Not Alone: The Impact of Externalities on Public Good Provision

Engel, Christoph; Rockenbach, Bettina - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2009

Public good provision is often local and also affects bystanders. Is provision harder if contributions harm bystanders, and is provision easier if outsiders gain a windfall profit? In an experiment we observe that both positive and negative externalities reduce provision levels whenever actors...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008614920

Give Everybody a Voice! The Power of Voting in a Public Goods Experiment with Externalities

Engel, Christoph; Rockenbach, Bettina - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2014

We study the effect of voting when insiders’ public goods provision may affect passive outsiders. Without voting insiders’ contributions do not differ, regardless of whether outsiders are positively or negatively affected or even unaffected. Voting on the recommended contribution level...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011106491

The Joint Benefits of Observed and Unobserved Punishment: Comment to Unobserved Punishment Supports Cooperation

Glöckner, Andreas; Kube, Sebastian; Nicklisch, Andreas - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2011

is able to sustain cooperation in groups even when it is observed only in the end of the interaction sequence. Our …. Providing both unobserved and observed punishment strongly enhances cooperation within groups – strikingly, even with less …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010535929

Asymmetric Enforcement of Cooperation in a Social Dilemma

Nikiforakis, Nikos; Normann, Hans-Theo; Wallace, Brian - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2009

fostering cooperation and as efficient as symmetric institutions. At the individual level, we find that players with higher …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008633227

Cooperation norms in multiple-stage punishment

Nicklisch, Andreas; Wolff, Irenaeus - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2009

Carpenter and Matthews (2009) examine the cooperation norms determining people's punishment behavior in a social …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008474676

Ostracism and the Provision of a Public Good, Experimental Evidence

Maier-Rigaud, Frank P.; Martinsson, Peter; Staffiero, … - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2005

We analyze the effects of ostracism on cooperation in a linear public good experiment. Our results show that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005612385

Leading with(out) Sacrifice? A Public-Goods Experiment with a Super-Additive Player

Glöckner, Andreas; Irlenbusch, Bernd; Kube, Sebastian; … - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2009

We analyse two team settings in which one member in a team has stronger incentives to contribute than the others. If contributions constitute a sacrifice for the strong player, the other team members are more inclined to cooperate than if contributions are strictly dominant for the strong player.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005612391

Cooperation under punishment: Imperfect information destroys it and centralizing punishment does not help

Fischer, Sven; Grechenig, Kristoffel; Meier, Nicolas - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2013

We run several experiments which allow us to compare cooperation under perfect and imperfect information and under a … centralized and decentralized punishment regime. We nd that (1) centralization by itself does not improve cooperation and welfare … decentralized punishment, that is, it leads to signicantly lower cooperation and welfare (total prots). Our results shed critical …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010667904

Can we manage first impressions in cooperation problems? An experiment

Engel, Christoph; Kube, Sebastian; Kurschilgen, Michael - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2011

to emerge. We find that cooperation crucially depends on pre-play information, coinciding with a change in initial …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009021692

Learning in experimental 2 x 2 games

Chmura, Thorsten; Goerg, Sebastian; Selten, Reinhard - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2011

In this paper, we introduce two new learning models: impulse-matching learning and action-sampling learning. These two models together with the models of self-tuning EWA and reinforcement learning are applied to 12 different 2 x 2 games and their results are compared with the results from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009418465