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We study the effect of voting when insiders’ public goods provision may affect passive outsiders. Without voting insiders’ contributions do not differ, regardless of whether outsiders are positively or negatively affected or even unaffected. Voting on the recommended contribution level...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011106491
, and is provision easier if outsiders gain a windfall profit? In an experiment we observe that both positive and negative …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008614920
controlled conditions, we have conducted a public goods experiment with central punishment. The authority is neutral – she does …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010731963
Customary law has been criticized from very different angles. Rational choice theorists claim that what looks like custom is nothing but self-interest. Positivists doubt that anything beyond consent assumes the force of law. In this paper, we adopt an experimental approach to test these claims....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010535930
In their majority, public international lawyers postulate that for a new rule of customary law to originate, two conditions must be fulfilled: there must be consistent practice, and it must be shown that this practice is motivated by the belief that such behaviour is required in law. Maurice...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008574251
From the perspective of competitors, competition may be modeled as a prisoner’s dilemma. Setting the monopoly price is cooperation, undercutting is defection. Jointly, competitors are better off if both are faithful to a cartel. Individually, profit is highest if only the competitor(s) is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009021689
We run several experiments which allow us to compare cooperation under perfect and imperfect information and under a centralized and decentralized punishment regime. We nd that (1) centralization by itself does not improve cooperation and welfare compared to an informal, peer-to-peer punishment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010667904
The need for efficient coordination is ubiquitous in organizations and industries. The literature on the determinants of efficient coordination has focused on individual decision making so far. In reality, however, teams often have to coordinate with other teams. We present a series of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004992853
We analyse two team settings in which one member in a team has stronger incentives to contribute than the others. If contributions constitute a sacrifice for the strong player, the other team members are more inclined to cooperate than if contributions are strictly dominant for the strong player.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005612391
In this paper, we introduce two new learning models: impulse-matching learning and action-sampling learning. These two models together with the models of self-tuning EWA and reinforcement learning are applied to 12 different 2 x 2 games and their results are compared with the results from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009418465