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Network Neutrality and Network Management Regulation: Quality of Service, Price Discrimination, and Exclusive Contracts
Economides, Nicholas; Tåg, Joacim - NET Institute - 2011
We compare four approaches to network neutrality and network management regulation in a two-sided market model: (i) no variations in Quality of Service and no price discrimination; (ii) variations in Quality of Service but no price discrimination; (iii) variations in Quality of Service and price...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010905480
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Net Neutrality on the Internet: A Two-sided Market Analysis
Economides, Nicholas; Tåg, Joacim - NET Institute - 2007
We discuss the benefits of net neutrality regulation in the context of a two-sided market model in which platforms sell Internet access services to consumers and may set fees to content and applications providers “on the other side” of the Internet. When access is monopolized, we find that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005760651
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Net Neutrality on the Internet: A Two-sided Market Analysis
Economides, Nicholas; Tåg, Joacim - NET Institute - 2007
We discuss the benefits of net neutrality regulation in the context of a two-sided market model in which platforms sell Internet access services to consumers and may set fees to content and applications providers “on the other side” of the Internet. When access is monopolized, we find that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005585461
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Collusion and the political differentiation of newspapers
Antonielli, Marco; Filistrucchi, Lapo - NET Institute - 2011
prices and advertising tariffs. We build on the work of Gabszewicz, Laussel and Sonnac (2001, 2002), whose model we take as …), cover prices are positive and the minimal differentiation outcome does not depend on the size of the advertising market. We … to cooperate in setting cover prices and advertising tariffs but not the editorial line …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010905448
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Customer Infomation Sharing: Strategic Incentives and New Implications
Kim, Byung-Cheol; Choi, Jay Pil - NET Institute - 2007
We study oligopolistic firms' incentives to share customer information about past purchase history in a situation where firms are uncertain about whether a particular consumer considers the product offerings complements or substitutes. By addressing this new type of behavior-based price...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005585473