developers are among the leading features of those “platform” industries. However, they are rarely incorporated into applied … externalities and propose the solution concept of Insulated Equilibrium to resolve it. At such equilibrium, each platform’s price on … the necessity for consumer coordination and the multiplicity of platform best replies. This allows us to solve a model of …

We discuss the benefits of net neutrality regulation in the context of a two-sided market model in which platforms sell … Internet. When access is monopolized, we find that generally net neutrality regulation (that imposes zero fees “on the other … side” of the market) increases total industry surplus compared to the fully private optimum at which the monopoly platform …

We discuss the benefits of net neutrality regulation in the context of a two-sided market model in which platforms sell … Internet. When access is monopolized, we find that generally net neutrality regulation (that imposes zero fees “on the other … side” of the market) increases total industry surplus compared to the fully private optimum at which the monopoly platform …

In many industries, consumers rely on recommendations by an intermediary when choosing between competing products. In … intermediary and two firms who decide how much to invest. Under a variety of contractual environments (vertical integration, ex … post endorsement) we show that, even though the intermediary tends to endorse the best firm, contractual endorsement …

heterogeneous in the value they bring to other users or to the platform. We develop a model with multi-dimensional heterogeneity … where a monopoly platform chooses (price or non-price) instruments. Users play two roles: 1) they are users of the platform …’s services with heterogeneous preferences over instruments and platform characteristics; 2) they make heterogeneous contributions …