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Economides, Nicholas - NET Institute - 2014

may entail. We also discuss the impact on consumers and competition, as well as potential antitrust liability of bundling …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010938600

The Quest for Appropriate Remedies in the Microsoft Antitrust EU Cases: A Comparative Appraisal

Economides, Nicholas; Lianos, Ioannis - NET Institute - 2009

substantive liability standards for dominant firms in US antitrust law and in EC Competition law. The competition law remedies … roots of the competition law violation identified in the liability decision and others who advance the view that the … developing such a remedy in the future are briefly discussed before more emphasis is put on alternative remedies (competition and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004967587

Moderated Online Communities and User-Generated Content

Chen, Jianqing; Xu, Hong; Whinston, Andrew B. - NET Institute - 2009

Online communities provide a social sphere for people to share information and knowledge. While information sharing is becoming a ubiquitous online phenomenon, how to ensure information quality or induce quality content, however, remains a challenge due to the anonymity of commentators. This...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008479189

A Critical Appraisal of Remedies in the EU Microsoft Cases

Economides, Nicholas; Lianos, Ioannis - NET Institute - 2009

We discuss and compare the remedies in the two cases antitrust cases of the European Union (EU) against Microsoft. The first EU case alleged (i) that Microsoft illegally bundled the Windows Media Player (WMP) with Windows; and (ii) that Microsoft did not provide adequate documentation that would...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008621689

Tying, Bundling, and Loyalty/Requirement Rebates

Economides, Nicholas - NET Institute - 2010

I discuss the impact of tying, bundling, and loyalty/requirement rebates on consumer surplus in the affected markets. I show that the Chicago School Theory of a single monopoly surplus that justifies tying, bundling, and loyalty/requirement rebates on the basis of efficiency typically fails....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008774549

Patent Licensing Networks

Jeon, Doh-Shin; Lefouili, Yassine - NET Institute - 2014

This paper investigates the patent licensing networks formed by competing firms. Assuming that licensing agreements can involve the payment of fixed fees only and that firms compete à la Cournot, we show that the complete network is always bilaterally efficient and that the monopoly network is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010933642

Optimal Cartel Prices in Two-Sided Markets Access

Boffa, Federico; Filistrucchi, Lapo - NET Institute - 2014

We study optimal cartel prices in a two-sided market. We present a simple model showing that prices above the two-sided monopoly price may prevail on one side of a two-sided market as a means to enhance the sustainability of the cartel. We prove that in such a case a higher benefit from the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010936552

Digital Rights Management and Technological Tying

Kim, Jin-Hyuk - NET Institute - 2008

This paper analyzes DRM-based technological tying, where the content and hardware form a system. A closed DRM system makes the legal content incompatible with a rival’s hardware, whose users must then obtain illegal copies. The main finding is that the tying firm gains market power in a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005622683

The Elusive Antitrust Standard on Bundling in Europe and in the United States at the Aftermath of the Microsoft Cases

Economides, Nicholas; Lianos, Ioannis - NET Institute - 2007

We analyze and contrast the US and EU antitrust standards on mixed bundling and tying. We apply our analysis to the US and EU cases against Microsoft on the issue of tying new products (Internet Explorer in the US, and Windows Media Player in the EU) with Windows as well as to cases brought in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005622690

Patents and Antitrust: Application to Adjacent Markets

Economides, Nicholas; Hebert, William N. - NET Institute - 2007

We examine the intersection of patents and antitrust where a patent holder uses the monopoly power it possesses in the market for a patented product to exclude competitors in an adjacent market and attempt to monopolize or monopolize the adjacent market. The present scheme for awarding patents...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005622684