Global risk-off shocks can be highly destabilizing for financial markets and, absent an adequate policy response, may trigger severe recessions. Policy responses were more complex for developed economies with very low interest rates after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). We document, however,...

Financial systems are inherently fragile because of the very function which makes them valuable: liquidity transformation. Regulatory reforms can strengthen the financial system and decrease the risk of liquidity crises, but they cannot eliminate it completely. This leaves monetary policy with a...

We use the founding of the Federal Reserve as a historical experiment to provide some insight into whether a lender of last resort can stabilize financial markets. Following the Panic of 1907, Congress passed two measures that established a lender of last resort in the United States: (1) the...

"Intermediary asset pricing'' understands asset prices and risk premia through the lens of frictions in financial intermediation. Perhaps motivated by phenomena in the financial crisis, intermediary asset pricing has been one of the fastest growing areas of research in finance. This article...

I extend the methods of Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005) to separately identify the effects of Federal Reserve forward guidance and large-scale asset purchases (LSAPs) during the 2009-15 U.S. zero lower bound (ZLB) period. I find that both forward guidance and LSAPs had substantial and...

We develop a model of monetary exchange in over-the-counter markets to study the effects of monetary policy on asset prices and standard measures of financial liquidity, such as bid-ask spreads, trade volume, and the incentives of dealers to supply immediacy, both by participating in the...

What accounts for inflation after 2008? We use the prominent pre-crisis Smets-Wouters (2007) model to address this question. We find that due to price markup shocks alone inflation would have been 1% higher than observed and 0.5% higher that the long-run average. Their standard deviation is...

Foreign banks pulled significant funding from their U.S. branches during the Great Recession. We estimate that the average-sized branch experienced a 12 percent net internal fund "withdrawal," with the fund transfer disproportionately bigger for larger branches. This internal shock to the...

Considerable debate rages about whether Federal Reserve policy was too lax in the early part of the 2000s, thereby fueling the home-price bubble that was the proximate cause of the global financial crisis. We present evidence that the view that modest alterations to monetary policy have vast...

This paper models and estimates ex ante safety-net benefits at a sample of large banks in US and Europe during 2003-2008. Our results suggest that difficult-to-fail and unwind (DFU) banks enjoyed substantially higher ex ante benefits than other institutions. Safety-net benefits prove...