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Baye, Michael R.; Kovenock, Dan; Vries, Casper G. de - Tinbergen Institute - 2009

, tournaments, R&D races, models of ligitation, and a host of other contests. …-order contests with complete information, in which each player's strategy generates direct or indirect affine "spillover" effects … important economic environments, as well as in classic contests adapted to recent experimental and behavioral models where …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004964456

Alternating Offers in Economic Environments

Houba, Harold - Tinbergen Institute

The Nash bargaining solution of a modified bargaining problem in the contract space yields the pair of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium proposals in the alternating offers model, also for positive time between proposals. As time vanishes, convergence to the Nash bargaining solution is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005209433

Stochastic Orders of Proposing Players in Bargaining

Houba, Harold - Tinbergen Institute

The bargaining model with stochastic order of proposing players is properly embedded in continuous time and it is strategically equivalent to the alternating offers model. For all parameter values, the pair of equilibrium proposals corresponds to the Nash bargaining solution of a modified...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005209487

Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model with Different Time Preferences

Houba, Harold; Wen, Quan - Tinbergen Institute - 2006

There has been a long debate on equilibrium characterization in the negotiation model when players have different time preferences. We show that players behave quite differently under different time preferences than under common time preferences. Conventional analysis in this literature relies...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144464

The Unique-lowest Sealed-bid Auction

Houba, Harold; Laan, Dinard van der; Veldhuizen, Dirk - Tinbergen Institute - 2008

Unique-lowest sealed-bid auctions are auctions in which participation is endogenous and the winning bid is the lowest bid among all unique bids. Such auctions admit very many Nash equilibria (NEs) in pure and mixed strategies. The two-bidders' auction is similar to the Hawk-Dove game, which...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136936

Competitive Bidding in Auctions with Private and Common Values

Goeree, Jacob K.; Offerman, Theo - Tinbergen Institute - 2000

The objects for sale in most auctions possess both private and common value elements. This salient feature has not yet been incorporated into a strategic analysis of equilibrium bidding behaviour. This paper reports such an analysis for a stylised model in which bidders receive a private value...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005450754

On Borel Probability Measures and Noncooperative Game Theory

Frenk, J.B.G.; Kassay, G.; Protassov, V. - Tinbergen Institute - 2002

In this paper the well-known minimax theorems of Wald, Ville and Von Neumann are generalized under weaker topological conditions on the payoff function <i>f</i> and/or extended to the larger set of the Borel probability measures instead of the set of mixed strategies.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005450809