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Baye, Michael R.; Kovenock, Dan; Vries, Casper G. de - Tinbergen Institute - 2009

, tournaments, R&D races, models of ligitation, and a host of other contests. …-order contests with complete information, in which each player's strategy generates direct or indirect affine "spillover" effects … important economic environments, as well as in classic contests adapted to recent experimental and behavioral models where …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004964456

The Unique-lowest Sealed-bid Auction

Houba, Harold; Laan, Dinard van der; Veldhuizen, Dirk - Tinbergen Institute - 2008

Unique-lowest sealed-bid auctions are auctions in which participation is endogenous and the winning bid is the lowest bid among all unique bids. Such auctions admit very many Nash equilibria (NEs) in pure and mixed strategies. The two-bidders' auction is similar to the Hawk-Dove game, which...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136936

On Finding Curb Sets in Extensive Games

Pruzhansky, Vitaly - Tinbergen Institute - 2003

We characterize strategy sets that are closed under rational behavior (curb) in extensive games of perfect information and finite horizon. It is shown that any such game possesses only one minimal curb set, which necessarily includes all its subgame perfect Nash equilibria. Applications of this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137151

A Discussion of Maximin

Pruzhansky, Vitaly - Tinbergen Institute - 2004

This paper builds on one of the results of Pruzhansky [22], namely that maximin strategies guarantee the same expected payo.s as mixed Nash equilibrium strategies in bimatrix games. We present a discussion on the applicability of maximin strategies in such class of games. The usefulness of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005450748

Competitive Bidding in Auctions with Private and Common Values

Goeree, Jacob K.; Offerman, Theo - Tinbergen Institute - 2000

The objects for sale in most auctions possess both private and common value elements. This salient feature has not yet been incorporated into a strategic analysis of equilibrium bidding behaviour. This paper reports such an analysis for a stylised model in which bidders receive a private value...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005450754

On Borel Probability Measures and Noncooperative Game Theory

Frenk, J.B.G.; Kassay, G.; Protassov, V. - Tinbergen Institute - 2002

In this paper the well-known minimax theorems of Wald, Ville and Von Neumann are generalized under weaker topological conditions on the payoff function <i>f</i> and/or extended to the larger set of the Borel probability measures instead of the set of mixed strategies.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005450809