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This paper models and estimates ex ante safety-net benefits at a sample of large banks in US and Europe during 2003-2008. Our results suggest that difficult-to-fail and unwind (DFU) banks enjoyed substantially higher ex ante benefits than other institutions. Safety-net benefits prove...
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We develop a theory of bank board risk committees. With this theory, such committees are valuable even though there is no expectation that bank risk is lower if the bank has a well-functioning risk committee. As predicted by our theory (1) many large and complex banks voluntarily chose to have a...
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Regulatory independence forms a foundation for modern financial systems. To illuminate the value of this ubiquitous institution, we examine a Progressive Era policy experiment in which hitherto independent regulators came under gubernatorial supervision. After this change, failure rates declined...
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An issue confronting U.S. policymakers is whether restrictions on securities activities of U.S. commercial banks ought to be abolished within a broader program of banking and financial market deregulation. The Euro-bond market offers an opportunity to examine the performance of a largely...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012477661
We characterize how U.S. global systemically important banks (GSIBs) supply short-term dollar liquidity in repo and foreign exchange swap markets in the post-Global Financial Crisis regulatory environment and serve as the "lenders-of-second-to-last-resort". Using daily supervisory bank balance...
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In this paper we revisit the debate over the role of the banking panics in 1930-33 in precipitating the Great Contraction. The issue hinges over whether the panics were illiquidity shocks and hence in support of Friedman and Schwartz (1963) greatly exacerbated the recession which had begun in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012462291