We characterize optimal taxation of foreign capital and optimal sovereign debt policy in a small open economy where the government cannot commit to policy and seeks to insure a risk averse domestic constituency. The expected tax on capital is shown to vary with the state of the economy,...

The aging of the population shakes the confidence in the economic viability of pay-as-you-go social security systems. We demonstrate how in a political-economy framework the shaken cofidence leads to the downsizing of the social security-system, and to the emergence of supplemental individual...

We develop a model that captures important features of debt crises of the Brazilian type. Its applicability to Brazil lies in the fact that (1) in Brazil the macro fundamentals were sound (e.g., a primary surplus, a relatively low debt/GDP ratio, etc.); and (2) in the Brazilian case the trigger...

This paper shows that whether or not a sovereign can borrow to smooth consumption depends both on how consumption smoothing is achieved, whether by contingent debt issuance or by contingent debt servicing, and on the exact nature of the penalty for debt repudiation. If a sovereign that...

Bequest constraints have played a major role in discussions of debt neutrality but their welfare implications were not sufficiently dealt with in the literature. In this paper we focus on the welfare implications of bequest constraints. We found that when institutional constraints to the...

This paper argues that before World War II the desire to maintain a trustworthy reputation for honoring war debts was an important factor in inducing deflationary postwar monetary policies in both the United Kingdom and the United States. The paper then asks why this policy objective did not...

This paper analyzes a reputational equilibrium in a model in which nominally denominated sovereign debt serves to shift risk associated with the unpredictability of tax revenues from the sovereign to its lenders. The analysis answers the following set of related questions: Why would a sovereign...

History suggests the following stylized facts about default on sovereign debt:(1) Defaults are associated with identifiably bad states of the world. (2) Defaults are usually partial, rather than complete.(3) Sovereign states usually are able to borrow again soon after a default. Motivated by...

This paper proposes a tractable framework to analyze fiscal space and the dynamics of government debt, with a possibly binding zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint. Without the ZLB, a greater primary deficit unambiguously raises debt. However, debt need not explode: When R G - φ, where φ is the...

We develop a model that captures important features of debt crises of the Brazilian type. Its applicability to Brazil lies in the fact that (1) macro fundamentals were sound in the wake of the crisis (e .g., a non-negligible primary surplus, a relatively low debt/GDP ratio, low inflation, etc.);...