The aging of the population shakes the confidence in the economic viability of pay-as-you-go social security systems. We demonstrate how in a political-economy framework the shaken cofidence leads to the downsizing of the social security-system, and to the emergence of supplemental individual...

Bequest constraints have played a major role in discussions of debt neutrality but their welfare implications were not sufficiently dealt with in the literature. In this paper we focus on the welfare implications of bequest constraints. We found that when institutional constraints to the...

This paper proposes a tractable framework to analyze fiscal space and the dynamics of government debt, with a possibly binding zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint. Without the ZLB, a greater primary deficit unambiguously raises debt. However, debt need not explode: When R G - φ, where φ is the...

We develop a model that captures important features of debt crises of the Brazilian type. Its applicability to Brazil lies in the fact that (1) macro fundamentals were sound in the wake of the crisis (e .g., a non-negligible primary surplus, a relatively low debt/GDP ratio, low inflation, etc.);...

We develop a model that captures important features of debt crises of the Brazilian type. Its applicability to Brazil lies in the fact that (1) in Brazil the macro fundamentals were sound (e.g., a primary surplus, a relatively low debt/GDP ratio, etc.); and (2) in the Brazilian case the trigger...

We develop a stylised model of multiple equilibria, with country risk spreads at the focus of the analysis. Fears that the country default on its debt triggers a reversal in the direction of inflows of international financial capital raise interest-rate spreads and thus the cost of servicing the...

We address the question of whether and how a sovereign should reduce its external indebtedness when default is a significant possibility, with a particular focus on whether a sovereign should buy back or dilute existing long-term sovereign bonds. Our main finding is that when reduction of debt...

In this chapter, we use a benchmark limited-commitment model to explore key issues in the economics of sovereign debt. After highlighting conceptual issues that distinguish sovereign debt as well as reviewing a number of empirical facts, we use the model to discuss debt overhang, risk sharing,...

We study the interactions between sovereign debt default and maturity choice in a setting with limited commitment for repayment as well as future debt issuances. Our main finding is that under a wide range of conditions the sovereign should, as long as default is not preferable, remain passive...