Frontmatter -- Acknowledgements -- Foreword -- Contents -- Preface -- Introduction -- Part I: A dynamic landscape for leadership and change -- Chapter 1 In constant motion -- Chapter 2 Complexity, straightforwardly -- Chapter 3 Leadership in the midst -- Part II: Tools and techniques for...

We empirically examine two competing views of CEO pay. In the contracting view, pay is used to solve an agency problem: the compensation committee optimally chooses pay contracts which give the CEO incentives to maximize shareholder wealth. In the skimming view, pay is the result of an agency...

In this paper, we use a French matched employer-employee survey, the COI survey, conducted in 1997, to describe the general features of organizational change in manufacturing firms with more than 50 employees. In a first section, we explore the methodological issues associated with the building...

This paper uses stochastic simulation and my U.S. econometric model to examine the optimal choice of monetary policy instruments. Are the variances, covariances, and parameters in the model such as to favor one instrument over the other, in particular the interest rate over the money supply? The...

In this paper we examine the factors affecting the structure of executives' compensation packages. We focus particularly on the role of various types of delayed compensation as means of "bonding" executives to their firms. The basic problem is to design a compensation package that rewards...

This paper surveys the recent literature on CEO compensation. The rapid rise in CEO pay over the past 30 years has sparked an intense debate about the nature of the pay-setting process. Many view the high level of CEO compensation as the result of powerful managers setting their own pay. Others...

In this paper we describe the important features of executive compensation in the US from 1993 to 2006. Some confirm what has been found for earlier periods and some are novel. Important facts about compensation are that: the compensation distribution is highly skewed; each year, a sizeable...

Stock prices are more informative when the information has less social value. Speculators with limited resources making costly (private) information production decisions must decide to produce information about some firms and not others. We show that producing and trading on private information...