This paper supplies an agency-cost and contestable-markets perspective on the financial policies that triggered the Asian financial crisis. The agency-cost analysis hypothesizes that individual-country regulators knew that politically directed loans had made their banks insolvent, but...

This paper employs a novel multi-country dataset of corporate defaults to develop a model of distress risk specific to emerging markets. The data suggest that global financial variables such as US interest rates and shifts in global liquidity and risk aversion have significant predictive power...

During the global financial crisis, the Reserve Bank of India enacted forbearance measures that lowered capital provisioning rates for loans under temporary liquidity stress. Matched bank-firm data reveal that troubled banks took advantage of the policy to also shield firms facing serious...

This paper tests the optimal-contracting hypothesis, drawing upon data from a natural experiment that ended during the Great Depression. The subjects of our experiment are bank stockholders. The experimental manipulation concerns the imposition of state or federal restrictions on the contracts...

This paper documents a set of new stylized facts about leverage and financial fragility for emerging market firms following the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Corporate debt vulnerability indicators during the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) attributed to corporate financial roots provide a...