We show that if the central bank operates without commitment and faces constraints on its balance sheet, helicopter drops can be a useful stabilization tool during a liquidity trap. With commitment, even with balance sheet constraints, helicopter drops are irrelevant

This paper investigates the implications of international financial sanctions for the reserve currency status of the US dollar. We propose a simple model of a reserve currency, demonstrate how the anticipation of financial sanctions can weaken the dollar's status, and evaluate the welfare...

Using a survey with information treatments conducted in the aftermath of SVB's collapse, we study households' perspectives on bank stability, the potential for panic-driven bank runs, and the role of public communication. When informed about SVB's collapse, households become more likely to...

We examine banking regulation in a macroeconomic model of bank runs. We construct a general equilibrium model where banks may default because of fundamental or self-fulfilling runs. With only fundamental defaults, we show that the competitive equilibrium is constrained efficient. However, when...

This paper studies the transmission channels of monetary and macroprudential policies in an open economy framework and evaluates the normative implications for international spillovers and global welfare. An analytical decomposition uncovers the prominent role of expenditure switching for...

This paper provides new survey evidence on firms' inflation expectations in the euro area. Building on the ECB's Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises (SAFE), we introduce consistent measurement of inflation expectations across countries and shed new light on the properties and causal...

Many central banks whose exchange rate regimes are classified as flexible are reluctant to let the exchange rate fluctuate. This phenomenon is known as "fear of floating". We present a simple theory in which fear of floating emerges as an optimal policy outcome. The key feature of the model is...

Financial integration generates macroeconomic spillovers that may require international monetary policy coordination. We show that individual central banks may set nominal interest rates too low or too high relative to the cooperative outcome. We identify three sufficient statistics that...