Financial repression can be used to avoid a government default when fiscal policy is constrained. We present a model showing that optimal financial repression progresses through successive stages with increasing levels of distortion. Data from advanced economies suggest that the initial stage of...

We assess the efficacy of systemic risk measures that rely on U.S. financial firms' stock return co-movements with market- or sector-wide returns under stress from 1927 to 2023. We ascertain stress episodes based on widening of corporate bond spreads and narrative dating. Systemic risk measures...

We evaluate the decentralized structure of the Federal Reserve System as a mechanism for generating and processing new ideas on banking policy in the 1950s and 1960s. We document that demand for research and analysis was driven by banking industry developments and legal changes that required the...

Banks' reluctance to repair their balance sheets, combined with deposit insurance and regulatory forbearance in recognizing greater risks and losses, can lead to solvency problems that look like liquidity (bank-run) crises. Regulatory forbearance incentivizes banks to both retain risky loans and...

The effects of large banks on the real economy are theoretically ambiguous and politically controversial. I identify quasi-exogenous increases in bank size in postwar Germany. I show that firms did not grow faster after their relationship banks became bigger. In fact, opaque borrowers grew more...

This paper studies the optimal design of second-best corrective regulation, when some agents or activities cannot be perfectly regulated. We show that policy elasticities and Pigouvian wedges are sufficient statistics to characterize the marginal welfare impact of regulatory policies in a large...

We develop a theory of bank board risk committees. With this theory, such committees are valuable even though there is no expectation that bank risk is lower if the bank has a well-functioning risk committee. As predicted by our theory (1) many large and complex banks voluntarily chose to have a...