A number of formerly regulated multiproduct industries have a transitional or permanent residual regulatory mandate to protect consumers from "excessive" prices. The legislation that deregulated most rail rates contains a statutory mandate for the regulator to protect shippers from "excessive"...

In government-sponsored health insurance, subsidy design affects market outcomes. First, holding premiums fixed, subsidies determine insurance uptake and average cost. Insurers then respond to these changes, adjusting premiums. Combining data from the first four years of the California ACA...

Concentration-based screens for horizontal mergers, such as those employed in the US DOJ and FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines, play a central role in merger analysis. However, the basis for these screens, in both form and level, remains unclear. We show that there is both a theoretical and an...

We consider the impact of domestic antidumping law in a two-country partial equilibrium model where domestic and foreign firms tacitly collude in the domestic market. Firms engage in an infinitely repeated game, with each period composed of a two-stage game. In the first stage each firm chooses...

The purpose of this paper is to understand the effects of endogenous markups and trade costs on the pricing behavior of exporters when firms are heterogeneous in productivity. Using new analytical distributions for markups under Bertrand competition, we uncover Ricardian patterns of export...

The United States and other nations rely on consumer choice and price competition among competing health plans to allocate resources in the health sector. A great deal of research has examined the efficiency consequences of adverse selection in health insurance markets, less attention has been...

This paper provides a new explanation for tying that is not based on any of the standard explanations -- efficiency, price discrimination, and exclusion. Our analysis shows how a monopolist sometimes has an incentive to tie a complementary good to its monopolized good in order to transfer...