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The conventional wisdom is that politicians' rent-seeking motives increase public debt and deficits. This is because myopic politicians face political risk and prefer to extract political rents as early as possible. An implication of this argument is that governments will under-save during a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464230
In this paper we examine the political economy. of capitalization in a Tiebout model when there is a rent-seeking public bureaucracy. A new approach is suggested for testing for the influence of successful local public sector rent-seeking on local property values. We present empirical evidence...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012477155
The model of rent-seeking presented in this paper is consistent with the observation that labor and management in an industry almost always adopt the same position concerning the desirability of import protection versus trade liberalization. The paper also discusses the size of the returns to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012477587
This paper provides the first evidence of the effect of tax policy on the likelihood of violent attacks against black politicians. I find a strong positive effect of local tax revenue on subsequent violence against black politicians. A dollar increase in per capita county taxes increases the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012479963
A tension between entry and rents lies at the core of a general theory of aggregation with scale effects. This paper characterizes the responses of macro aggregates to micro shocks in disaggregated economies with general forms of entry, internal or external returns to scale, input-output...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012481723
The absence of a competitive market may enable public-sector workers to extract rents from taxpayers in the form of high pay, especially when public-sector workers are unionized. On the other hand, this rent extraction may be suppressed by the ability of taxpayers to vote with their feet,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012461860
We analyze government interventions to alleviate debt overhang among banks. Interventions generate two types of rents. Informational rents arise from opportunistic participation based on private information while macroeconomic rents arise from free riding. Minimizing informational rents is a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012461931
Where legal systems and market forces enforce contracts inadequately, vertical integration can circumvent these transaction difficulties. But, such environments often also feature highly interventionist government, and even corruption. Vertical integration might then enhance returns to political...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463999
This paper analyzes the roots of variation in de facto institutions, within a constant de jure institutional setting. We explore the role of rent-seeking episodes in colonial Brazil as determinants of the quality of current local institutions, and argue that this variation reveals a de facto...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012465101
Initial inequality in endowments and opportunities, together with low average levels of endowments, can create constituencies in a society that combine to paralyze reforms, even though the status quo hurts them collectively. Each constituency prefers reforms that expand its opportunities, but in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012466575