The paper elicits a mechanism by which private leverage choices exhibit strategic complementarities through the reaction of monetary policy. When everyone engages in maturity transformation, authorities have little choice but facilitating refinancing. In turn, refusing to adopt a risky balance...

We study bank supervision by combining a theoretical model distinguishing supervision from regulation and a novel dataset on work hours of Federal Reserve supervisors. We highlight the trade-offs between the benefits and costs of supervision and use the model to interpret the relation between...

New security designs, improvements in computer telecommunications technology and advances in the theory of finance have led to revolutionary changes in the structure of financial markets and institutions. This paper provides a functional perspective on the dynamics of institutional change and...

We study whether banks are riskier if managers have less liability. We focus on New England between 1867 and 1880 and consider the introduction of marital property laws that limited liability for newly wedded bankers. We find that banks with managers who married after a legal change had more...

This paper analyzes the methods of loss concealment used by rogue traders in the Barings and Daiwa scandals. The analysis clarifies how and why these firms' top managers and home-country regulators deserve blame for allowing cumulative losses to become so large. The central point is that...

The majority of bank liabilities are deposits typically not withdrawn for extended periods. We propose a dynamic model of banks in which depositors forecast banks' leverage and default decisions, and withdraw optimally by trading off current against future liquidity needs. Endogenous deposit...