We develop a model where institutions form connections through swaps of projects in order to diversify their individual risk. These connections lead to two different network structures. In a clustered network groups of financial institutions hold identical portfolios and default together. In an...

Recent models of banking under asymmetric information argue that depositors penalize banks that offer high-risk deposits. Focusing on New York City banks in the 1920's and 1930's, this study examines how banks manage risk during normal times and in response to severe shocks. We develop and apply...

In competitive capital markets, risky debt claims that offer high yields in good times have high systematic risk exposure in bad times. We apply this idea to bank risk measurement. We find that banks with high accounting return on equity (ROE) prior to a crisis have higher systematic tail risk...

Portfolio performance in 401(k) plans depends on both the investment menu made available by plan sponsors and participants portfolio decisions. We use a unique dataset of nearly 1 million participants in one thousand pension plans to identify key portfolio inefficiencies in 401(k)...

This paper studies the relation between individuals' mutual fund flows and fund characteristics, establishing three key results. First, consistent with tax motivations, individual investors are reluctant to sell mutual funds that have appreciated in value and are willing to sell losing funds....

Modern open economy macro models assume the continuous adjustment of international portfolio allocation. We introduce gradual portfolio adjustment into a global equity market model. Our approach differs from related literature in two key dimensions. First, the time interval between portfolio...

We develop a model of banking industry dynamics to study the quantitative impact of capital requirements on equilibrium bank risk taking, commercial bank failure, interest rates on loans, and market structure. We propose a market structure where big banks with market power interact with small,...

Limited liability and asymmetric information between an investment bank and its lenders provide an incentive for a bank to undercapitalise and finance overly risky business projects. To counter this market failure, national governments have imposed solvency constraints on banks. However, these...

Bank risk-based capital (RBC) standards require banks to hold differing amounts of capital for different classes of assets, based almost entirely on a credit risk criterion. The paper provides both a theoretical and empirical framework for evaluating such standards. A model outlining a pricing...