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In order to enforce a collective choice to allocate resource to guarding against predators producers must subject themselves to the state's sovereign power to tax and to spend. But these sovereign powers in hand the state can exploit the producers by taxing and spending for its" own purposes....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012472524
Political competitiveness - which many interpret as the degree of democracy - can be modeled as a monopolistic competition. All regimes are constrained by the threat of "entry," and thereby seek some combination of popular support and political entry barriers. This simple model predicts that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012466008
Polities differ in the extent to which political parties can pre-commit to carry out promised policy actions if they take power. Commitment problems may arise due to a divergence between the ex ante incentives facing national parties that seek to capture control of the legislature and the ex...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012467285
We try to demonstrate how economists may engage in research on comparative politics, relating the size and composition of government spending to the political system. A Downsian model of electoral competition and forward-looking voting indicates that majoritarian -- as opposed to proportional --...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471964
This paper characterizes the efficient sequential equilibrium when a government uses indirect control to exert its authority. We develop a dynamic principal-agent model in which a principal (a government) delegates the prevention of a disturbance--such as riots, protests, terrorism, crime, or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012462907
theoretical results are summarized in a number of propositions. We discuss the implications of the theory, comment on its relation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463562
A key idea in political economy is that policy is often tailored to voters who are not ideologically attached - swing voters. We show, however, that in political environments where political parties can use repression and violence to exclude voters from elections, they may optimally target the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463848
In a model of evolution driven by conflict between societies more powerful states have an advantage. When the influence of outsiders is small we show that this results in a tendency to hegemony. In a simple example in which institutions differ in their "exclusiveness" we find that these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012459442
We present and experimentally test a mechanism that provides a simple, natural, low cost, and realistic solution to the problem of compliance with socially determined efficient actions, such as contributing to a public good. We note that small self-governing organizations often place enforcement...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012461627
Some public goods are provided entirely with private contributions, others with a mixture of public and private funding, and still others are entirely publicly funded. To explain this variation, a model of dual provision is developed that endogenizes public and private funding. Members of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012470948