This paper develops the view that monetary policy operates within a set of basic constraints that limit the set of outcomes that it can achieve.These include constraints on aggregate supply behavior that determine how a given path of nominal income growth will be divided between inflation and...

The process of central bank (CB) evolution by emerging market economies (EMEs), including central bank independence (CBI) and transparency (CBT), converged towards that of the advanced economies (AEs) before the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007-2008. It was greatly aided by the adoption of...

This paper shows that the inability to use monetary policy for macroeconomic stabilization leaves a government more vulnerable to a rollover crisis. We study a sovereign default model with self-fulfilling rollover crises, foreign currency debt, and nominal rigidities. When the government lacks...

This paper describes interactions between monetary and fiscal policies that affect equilibrium price levels and interest rates by critically surveying theories about (a) optimal anticipated inflation, (b) optimal unanticipated inflation, and (c) conditions that secure a "nominal anchor'' in the...

In this paper we critically review the literature on the political economy of monetary policy, with an eye on the questions raised by the recent financial crisis. We begin with a discussion of rules versus discretion. We then examine the issue of Central Banks independence both in normal times,...

Japan suffered a very high inflation rate in 1973-74. The CPI inflation rate rose to near 30% in 1974, the highest rate in the postwar Japanese history after the chaotic hyperinflation following the end of the Second World War. Traditionally, the oil crisis is blamed for the 1973-74 high...

In much of the world, growth is more stable than it once was. Looking at a sample of twentyfive countries, we find that in sixteen, real GDP growth is less volatile today than it was twenty years ago. And these declines are large, averaging more than fifty per cent. What accounts for the fact...

An independent central bank can manage its balance sheet and its capital so as to commit itself to a depreciation of its currency and an exchange-rate peg. This way, the central bank can implement the optimal escape from a liquidity trap, which involves a commitment to higher future inflation....

This paper argues, first, that it is inappropriate to presume that central banks will, in the absence of any tangible precommitment technology, inevitably behave in a `discretionary' fashion that implies an inflationary bias. Furthermore, there is no necessary tradeoff between `flexibility and...

This paper takes issue with two basic conclusions prevalent in the literature on central bank behavior. First, the paper argues that it is inappropriate to presume that central banks will, in the absence of any precommitment technology, necessarily behave in a 'discretionary' fashion that...