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This paper presents a market equilibrium model of CEO assignment, pay and incentives under risk aversion and heterogeneous moral hazard. Each of the three outcomes can be summarized by a single closed-form equation. In assignment models without moral hazard, allocation depends only on firm size...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012462666
In a labor market hierarchy, promotions are affected by the noisiness of information about the candidates. I study the hypothesis that males are more risk taking than females, and its implications for rates of promotion and abilities of survivors. I define promotion hierarchies with and without...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464183
Measuring the value of labor-market hires for stock prices, be it underwriters when firms go public (IPOs) or chief executive officers (CEOs), is difficult due to selection. Opaque firms with higher costs of capital benefit more from prestigious underwriters, while productive firms benefit more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012453048
We posit the problem of an autocrat who has to allocate access to the executive positions in his inner circle and define the career profile of his own insiders. Statically, granting access to an executive post to a more experienced subordinate increases political returns to the post, but is more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012458450
We present a model in which managers are risk-averse and firms compete for scarce managerial talent ("alpha"). When managers are not mobile across firms, firms provide efficient compensation, which allows for learning about managerial talent and for insurance of low-quality managers. When...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012459770
Although most of the political-economy literature blames inefficient policies on institutions or politicians' motives to supply bad policy, voters may themselves be partially responsible by demanding bad policy. In this paper, we posit that voters may systematically err when assessing potential...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012455764
We report experimental results for a twice-played prisoners' dilemma in which the players can choose the allocation of the stakes across the two periods. Our point of departure is the assumption that some (but not all) people are principled to "do the right thing," or cooperate, as long as their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012456738
due to the public good nature of pollution abatement. The theory of international environmental agreements (IEAs) in … century. The problem is that theory suggests fairly low (even zero) levels of contribution to a public good and high levels of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012458462
Implementation of workplace policies--whether through enforcement of laws or administration of programs--raises the question of the interaction between institutions created to carry out laws and the activities of workplace based agents that directly (e.g. unions) or indirectly (e.g. insurance...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012469135
In Lazear's (1979) model of efficient long-term incentive contracts, employers impose involuntary retirement based on age. This model implies that age discrimination laws, which bar involuntary terminations based on age, discourage the use of such contracts and reduce efficiency. Alternatively,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012472726