We empirically examine two competing views of CEO pay. In the contracting view, pay is used to solve an agency problem: the compensation committee optimally chooses pay contracts which give the CEO incentives to maximize shareholder wealth. In the skimming view, pay is the result of an agency...

This paper develops a simple theoretical model of the effect of an oil price increase on exchange rates. The model shows that the direction of this effect depends on a comparison of the direct balance of payments burden of the higher oil price with the indirect balance of payments benefits of...

The main thrust of this report is the development of a price record that would provide a basis for the identification of the areas of activity in the oil industry in which significant price changes have occurred, with expectation that this type of information could serve as a useful ingredient...

We estimate and attempt to explain the evolution of the taxes paid by U.S. multinationals on their foreign profits since 1966. In the oil sector, taxes paid to oil-producing States have been contained, allowing U.S. firms to earn high after-tax returns. Foreign taxes fell abruptly after the...

In this paper, we examine executive compensation data from 78 major U.S. oil and gas companies over a 24-year period. Perhaps in no other industry are the fortunes of so many executives so dependent on a single global commodity price. We find that a 10% increase in oil prices is associated with...

Russia is often considered a perfect example of the so-called "resource curse"--the argument that natural resource wealth tends to undermine democracy. Given high oil prices, some observers see the country as virtually condemned to authoritarian government for the foreseeable future. Reexamining...