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Corporate Tax Avoidance and High Powered Incentives

Desai, Mihir A. - 2004

This paper analyzes the links between corporate tax avoidance, the growth of high-powered incentives for managers, and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012468222

Executive Compensation : A Survey of Theory and Evidence

Edmans, Alex - 2017

This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on executive compensation. We start by presenting data on the level of CEO and other top executive pay over time and across firms, the changing composition of pay; and the strength of executive incentives. We compare pay in U.S. public...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012455086

Risk Perceptions, Board Networks, and Directors' Monitoring

Ding, Wenzhi; Chen, Lin; Schmid, Thomas; Weisbach, … - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2021

What makes independent directors perform their monitoring duty? One possible reason is that they are worried about being sanctioned by regulators if they do not monitor sufficiently well. Using unique features of the Chinese financial market, we estimate the extent to which independent...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012585458

Are Perks Purely Managerial Excess?

Rajan, Raghuram - 2004

corporate finance literature is that executive perks are a form of agency or private benefit and a way for managers to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012468199

Bureaucracy as a Mechanism to Generate Information

Novaes, Walter - 2003

Firms that maintain no formal record of actions and events would hardly be considered well managed. Yet, organizations that require the recording of actions and the filing of reports are often labeled bureaucratic' and inefficient. This paper argues that the thin line between efficient...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012468935

Asset Management Contracts and Equilibrium Prices

Buffa, Andrea M. - 2014

We study the joint determination of fund managers' contracts and equilibrium asset prices. Because of agency frictions …, investors make managers' fees more sensitive to performance and benchmark performance against a market index. This makes … managers unwilling to deviate from the index and exacerbates price distortions. Because trading against overvaluation exposes …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012458188

Indirect Incentives of Hedge Fund Managers

Lim, Jongha - 2013

managers. Flows respond quickly and strongly to performance; lagged performance has a monotonically decreasing impact on flows … times as large as direct incentives from incentive fees and returns to managers' own investment in the fund. For new funds … generated for their investors in a given year, managers receive close to another dollar in direct performance fees plus the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012459758

CEO Compensation

Frydman, Carola - 2010

result of powerful managers setting their own pay. Others interpret high pay as the result of optimal contracting in a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012462072

Risk and the CEO Market : Why Do Some Large Firms Hire Highly-Paid, Low-Talent CEOs?

Edmans, Alex - 2010

This paper presents a market equilibrium model of CEO assignment, pay and incentives under risk aversion and heterogeneous moral hazard. Each of the three outcomes can be summarized by a single closed-form equation. In assignment models without moral hazard, allocation depends only on firm size...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012462666

Tractability in Incentive Contracting

Edmans, Alex - 2009

This paper identifies a class of multiperiod agency problems in which the optimal contract is tractable (attainable in closed form). By modeling the noise before the action in each period, we force the contract to provide sufficient incentives state-by-state, rather than merely on average. This...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463104