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Signaling and Discrimination in Collaborative Projects

Onuchic, Paula; Ray, Debraj - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2021

We propose a model of collaborative work in pairs. Each potential partner draws an idea from a distribution that depends on their unobserved ability. The partners then choose to combine their ideas, or work separately. These decisions are based on the intrinsic value of their projects, but also...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012585423

Bayesian Persuasion

Kamenica, Emir - 2009

When is it possible for one person to persuade another to change her action? We take a mechanism design approach to this question. Taking preferences and initial beliefs as given, we introduce the notion of a persuasion mechanism: a game between Sender and Receiver defined by an information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463109

Optimal Money Burning : Theory and Application to Corporate Dividend Policy

Bernheim, B. Douglas - 1996

We explore signaling behavior in settings with a discriminating signal and several costly nondiscriminating ( money burning ) activities. In settings where informed parties have many options for burning money, existing theory provides no basis for selecting one nondiscriminating activity over...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012473160

Signalling, Incumbency Advantage, and Optimal Reelection Thresholds

Caselli, Francesco - 2012

types to voters. We identify two novel implications of models in which signalling incentives are important. First, because …. Second, voters can exploit the signalling behavior of politicians by precommitting to a higher threshold for signals received …. Raising the threshold discourages signalling effort by low quality politicians but encourages effort by high quality …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012460825

Games Daughters and Parents Play : Teenage Childbearing, Parental Reputation, and Strategic Transfers

Hao, Lingxin - 2000

In this paper, we examine the empirical implications of reputation formation using a game-theoretic model of intra-familial interactions. We consider parental reputation in repeated two-stage games in which daughters' decision to have a child as a teenager and the willingness of parents to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471097

Domestic Policies, National Sovereignty and International Economic Institutions

Bagwell, Kyle - 1999

To what extent must nations cede control over their economic and social policies if global efficiency is to be achieved in an interdependent world? This question is at the center of the debate over the future role of GATT (and its successor, the WTO) in the realm of labor and environmental...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471491

The Competition Between Competition Rules

Sinn, Hans-Werner - 1999

Open borders imply systems competition. This paper studies the implications of systems competition for the national competition rules. It is shown that an equilibrium where all countries retain their antitrust laws does not exist, since abolishing this law makes it possible for a single country...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471517

Conflicts and Common Interests in Committees

Li, Hao - 1999

Committees improve decisions by pooling independent information of members, but promote manipulation, obfuscation, and exaggeration of private evidence when members have conflicting preferences. We study how self-interest mediates these conflicting forces. When members' preferences differ, no...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471629

Does "Grease Money" Speed Up the Wheels of Commerce?

Kaufmann, Daniel - 1999

In an environment in which bureaucratic burden and delay are exogenous, an individual firm may find bribes helpful to reduce the effective red tape it faces. The efficient grease' hypothesis asserts therefore that corruption can improve economic efficiency and that fighting bribery would be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471704

Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Bilateral Opportunism and the Rules of GATT

Bagwell, Kyle - 1999

Trade negotiations occur through time and between the governments of many countries. An important issue is thus whether the value of concessions that a government wins in a current negotiation may be eroded in a future bilateral negotiation to which it is not party. In the absence of rules that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471725

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