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Committees improve decisions by pooling independent information of members, but promote manipulation, obfuscation, and exaggeration of private evidence when members have conflicting preferences. We study how self-interest mediates these conflicting forces. When members' preferences differ, no...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471629
In 2010, we informed a random set of Delhi councilors, some ineligible for re-election in their current ward, that a newspaper would report on their performance shortly prior to the 2012 city elections. Using slum dwellers' spending preferences, we created a councilor-specific index of pro-poor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012481883
The paper studies a voting scheme where members of a committee voting sequentially on a known series of binary proposals are each granted a single extra bonus vote to cast as desired - a streamlined version of Storable Votes. When the order of the agenda is exogenous, a simple sufficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464160
We analyze a model in which voters are uncertain about the policy preferences of candidates. Two forces affect the probability of electoral success: proximity to the median voter and campaign contributions. First, we show how campaign contributions affect elections. Then we show how the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464503
Polities differ in the extent to which political parties can pre-commit to carry out promised policy actions if they take power. Commitment problems may arise due to a divergence between the ex ante incentives facing national parties that seek to capture control of the legislature and the ex...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012467285
We analyzed two conditional cash transfers experiments that preceded Honduran presidential elections in 2001 and 2013. In the first, smaller transfers had no effects on voter turnout or incumbent vote share. In the second, larger transfers increased turnout and incumbent share in similar...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012456091
Much literature on political behavior treats politicians as motivated by reelection, choosing actions to signal their types to voters. We identify two novel implications of models in which signalling incentives are important. First, because incumbents only care about clearing a reelection...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012460825
We propose a new game theoretic approach to modeling large elections that overcomes the "paradox of voting" in a costly voting framework, without reliance on the assumption of ad hoc preferences for voting. The key innovation that we propose is the adoption of a "smooth" policy rule under which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012461261
obtained in a complete information setting, where coordination is easy, to those obtained in a setting with strategic risk … deterrent effect under complete information, this does not hold anymore under strategic risk. Rather, we find that increases in … weapon stocks can have a non-monotonic effect on the sustainability of peace. We also show that under strategic risk …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464685
discrete interdependent risks with heterogeneous agents. There is a threat of an event that can only happen once, and the risk … depends on actions taken by others. Any agent's incentive to invest in managing the risk depends on the actions of others …. Security problems at airlines and in computer networks come into this category, as do problems of risk management in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012468812