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This paper attempts to show the importance of history in influencing the structure of corporate ownership in France. The strong concentration of family ownership in France is traced to historical weaknesses in the money and capital markets that forced families to have recourse to self-financing....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012467974
. Second, did diffuse ownership systematically alter bank risk taking? It did. Banks with less concentrated ownership followed …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012460850
costs exceed the benefits of brokers' knowledge and expertise. Thus, quantification of the net value of brokerage services … indicates that agency costs exceed the advantages of brokers' knowledge and expertise by a wide margin …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464850
(e.g. bank profits) and the incentive to maximize firm value. Requiring financial expertise on boards, as mandated by …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012466757
We derive a measure that captures the extent to which overlapping ownership structures shift managers' incentives to internalize externalities. A key feature of the measure is that it allows for the possibility that not all investors are attentive to whether a manager's actions benefit the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012479596
costs and therefore have a strong incentive to minimize conflicts of interest with outside investors. We show that if equity … is overvalued, however, mispricing offsets agency costs and can induce a controlling shareholder to list equity. Higher … valuations support listings associated with greater agency costs. We test the predictions that follow from this idea on a sample …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012462742
The separation of ownership and control allows controlling shareholders to pursue private benefits. We develop an analytically tractable dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to study asset pricing and welfare implications of imperfect investor protection. Consistent with empirical...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012465401
The bulk of corporate governance theory examines the agency problems that arise from two extreme ownership structures: 100 percent small shareholders or one large, controlling owner combined with small shareholders. In this paper, we question the empirical validity of this dichotomy. In fact,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012465986
We present a model of succession in a firm controlled and managed by its founder. The founder decides between hiring a professional manager or leaving management to his heir, as well as on how much, if any, of the shares to float on the stock exchange. We assume that a professional is a better...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012469939
Transactions take place in the firm rather than in the market because the firm offers agents" who make specific investments power. Past literature emphasizes the allocation of ownership as the" primary mechanism by which the firm does this. Within the contractibility assumptions of this"...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012472538