Showing 1 - 10 of 283
Regulation of economic activity is ubiquitous around the world, yet standard theories predict it should be rather uncommon. I argue that the ubiquity of regulation is explained not so much by the failure of markets, or by asymmetric information, as by the failure of courts to solve contract and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012462999
We study two parties who desire a smooth trading relationship under conditions of value and cost uncertainty. A rigid contract fixing price works well in normal times since there is nothing to argue about. However, when value or cost is exceptional, one party will hold up the other , damaging...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012465106
We propose a model of cycles of distrust and conflict. Overlapping generations of agents from two groups sequentially … a sequence of bad actions originated. Assuming that both sides are not extremists, spirals of distrust and conflict get … this mechanism can be useful in interpreting cycles of ethnic conflict and international war, and how it also emerges in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012460403
In this article, we document and discuss salient features of collective bargaining systems in the OECD countries, with … bargaining. We hope that such an interest may help close the gap between how economists tend to model wage setting and how wages … that firms or employer associations bargain with unions over wages, producing collective bargaining systems. We show that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013388793
-degenerate higher-order beliefs) can lead to conflict and drive its dynamics. We develop our analysis in the context of three classic … learning about the opponent's type, as well as the possibility of conflict spirals, traps, and cycles; and a deterrence model …. We relate these models to the empirical literature and to current and historical episodes of conflict …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014372438
We develop a measure of a regime's tolerance for an action by its citizens. We ground our measure in an economic model and apply it to the setting of political protest. In the model, a regime anticipating a protest can take a costly action to repress it. We define the regime's tolerance as the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013334386
This paper explores the power of threats in the absence of binding commitment. The threatener cannot commit to carrying out the threat if the victim refuses payment, and cannot commit to not carrying out the threat if payment is made. If exercising the threat is costly to the threatener, then...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012473401
We study patterns of behavior in bilateral bargaining situations using a rich, new dataset describing over 88 million … listings from eBay's Best Offer platform, with back-and-forth bargaining occurring in over 25 million of these listings. We … document patterns of behavior and relate them to "rational" and "psychological" theories of bargaining and find that bargaining …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012453408
financial contracting predicts that liquidation values determine the allocation of bargaining power between creditors and … bargaining. This paper attempts to fill this gap. We develop an incomplete-contracting model of financial contract renegotiation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464587
behavior in various different situations, including games of common interest, coordination, asset trading and bargaining …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012466013