We investigate how demand conditions affect employers' provision of safety - something about which theory is ambivalent. Positive demand shocks relax financial constraints that limit safety investment, but simultaneously raise the opportunity cost of increasing safety rather than production. We...

We assess whether and why trade competition partly explains the sharp decline in U.S. workers' attempts to organize labor unions in recent decades. We find that between 1990-2007, import competition due to the "China Shock" lowered union certification elections by 4.5% among workers in...

Worker mobility across firms can enhance innovation by spreading knowledge, but such mobility may also hinder innovation by making firms reluctant to invest in R&D. A common way that firms limit workers' mobility is with noncompete agreements (NCAs). We examine how the legal enforceability of...

We analyze how the legal enforceability of noncompete agreements (NCAs) affects labor markets. Using newly-constructed panel data, we find that higher NCA enforceability diminishes workers' earnings and job mobility, with larger effects among workers most likely to sign NCAs. These effects are...