This is a paper in the ``economists ruin everything'' field. It considers whether Catch-22 situations can persist as an equilibrium phenomenon. Rather than being an arbitrary rule or a set of self-serving beliefs, the focus is on the preferences of Gatekeepers who choose to create such...

Two potentially asymmetric players compete for a prize of common value, which is initially unknown, by exerting efforts. A designer has two instruments for contest design. First, she decides whether and how to disclose an informative signal of the prize value to players. Second, she sets the...

We study a standard collective action problem in which successful achievement of a group interest requires costly participation by some fraction of its members. How should we model the internal organization of these groups when there is asymmetric information about the preferences of their...

The canonical example of unprotected speech--falsely shouting "fire" in a crowded theatre--presumes such an act inevitably causes harmful panic. This paper challenges that presumption through a game-theoretic analysis of evacuation dynamics. I model a theatre as an N * M grid where rational...

We study the dynamic properties of the wealth distribution in an overlapping generations model with warm-glow bequests and heterogeneous attitudes towards risk. Some dynasties of agents are risk averters, and others are risk lovers. Agents can invest in two types of Lucas trees. The two types of...

Revealed preference arguments are commonly used when identifying models of both single-agent decisions and non-cooperative games. We develop general identification results for a large class of models that have a linearly separable payoff structure. Our model allows for both discrete and...

Building on theories of international relations, we analyze how mistrust (uncertainty about an adversary's preferences or capabilities), misperception (imperfect observation of an adversary's actions), and misunderstanding (non-degenerate higher-order beliefs) can lead to conflict and drive its...

Just and efficient allocations of charity have attracted much academic and media attention. The sources of inefficiency and unjust are important to understand yet understudied. Our study aims to fill this void by directly modelling the victims' market in a collective reputation framework. By...

We study how people think others update their beliefs upon encountering new evidence. We find that when two individuals share the same prior, one believes that new evidence cannot systematically shift the other's beliefs in either direction (Martingale property). When the two have different...

We use response curves in a repeated game to analyze key aspects of mutual deterrence: escalation, de-escalation, incomplete deterrence, and deterrence by denial. In this approach, episodes of violence are due to interacting response curves, which disincentivize opponents from attacking through...