Showing 1 - 10 of 398
the policies they can pursue are constrained by the identity of the coalition members. In the model, a formateur picks a … coalition and negotiates for the allocation of the surplus it is expected to generate. The formateur is free to change … generalized version of a Nash Bargaining Solution in which --in contrast to the standard solution-- the coalition is endogenous …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012479615
We provide a potential explanation for the absence of, and unwillingness to create, centralized power in the hands of a national state based on the political agenda effect. State centralization induces citizens of different backgrounds, interests, regions or ethnicities to coordinate their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012456426
coalitions to provide public goods. Theory is ambiguous on the equilibrium coalition size and contribution rates. We examine the … emergence of coalitions, their size, and how uncertainty in public goods provision affects contribution levels and coalition … coalition to provide the good. Contrary a core theoretical result, we find that coalition size increases when the public good …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463106
We study the formation of a ruling coalition in political environments. Each individual is endowed with a level of … political power. The ruling coalition consists of a subset of the individuals in the society and decides the distribution of … resources. A ruling coalition needs to contain enough powerful members to win against any alternative coalition that may …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012465911
This paper uses detailed data on sequential offers from seven vastly different real-world bargaining settings to document a robust pattern: agents favor offers that split the difference between the two most recent offers on the table. Our settings include negotiations for used cars, insurance...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012599401
Using actual trade and tariff data for the United States and the European Community, this paper demonstrates how a trade negotiation such as the Tokyo Round, can be modelled as a game among countries attempting to minimize individual welfare loss functions. Once welfare functions are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012477496
Bargaining breakdown--whether as delay, conflict, or missing trade--plagues bargaining in environments with incomplete information. Can a bargaining environment that facilitates or restricts communication alleviate these costs? We exploit a unique opportunity to study this question using real...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012482204
This paper analyzes the strategic role of investment from a debtor country's perspective. The framework is one in which, if the debtor country is unable to meet debt obligations, a bargaining regime determines the amount of debt repayment. In the context of a two-country real trade model, debt...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012476029
The process of debt-rescheduling between a creditor and a sovereign (LDC) debtor is modeled as a noncooperative game built on a one-sector growth model. The creditor's threat to impose default penalties is ignored here as inherently incredible; instead, the debtor's motivation for repayment is to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012476473
Industries with significant scale economies or learning-by-doing may come to be dominated by a single firm. Economists have studied how likely this is to happen, and whether it is efficient, using models where buyers are price or quantity takers, even though these industries are often also...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014528398