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Risk Perceptions, Board Networks, and Directors' Monitoring

Ding, Wenzhi; Chen, Lin; Schmid, Thomas; Weisbach, … - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2021

What makes independent directors perform their monitoring duty? One possible reason is that they are worried about being sanctioned by regulators if they do not monitor sufficiently well. Using unique features of the Chinese financial market, we estimate the extent to which independent...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012585458

Understanding the Determinants of Managerial Ownership and the Link Between Ownership and Performance

Himmelberg, Charles P. - 2000

Both managerial ownership and performance are endogenously determined by exogenous (and only partly observed) changes in the firm's contracting environment. We extend the cross-sectional results of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and use panel data to show that managerial ownership is explained by key...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471259

Benefits of Control, Managerial Ownership, and the Stock Returns of Acquiring Firms

Hubbard, R. Glenn - 1995

This paper examines the effect of the benefits of corporate control to managers on the relationship between managerial … the acquiring firm increases, the interests of managers are more closely aligned with those of shareholders, reducing the … acquisition premium. At sufficiently high levels of managerial ownership, managers value a reduction in the risk of their …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012473808

Bankers on Boards : Monitoring, Conflicts of Interest, and Lender Liability

Kroszner, Randall S. - 1999

This paper investigates what factors determine whether a commercial banker is on the board of a non-financial firm. We consider the tradeoff between the benefits of direct bank monitoring to the firm and the costs of active bank involvement in firm management. Given the different payoff...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471465

Do Employees Benefit from Worker Representation on Corporate Boards?

Blandhol, Christine - 2020

Do employees benefit from worker representation on corporate boards? Economists and policymakers are keenly interested in this question - especially lately, as worker representation is widely promoted as an important way to ensure the interests and views of the workers. To investigate this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012482488

The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance : A Conceptual Framework and Survey

Adams, Renée - 2008

This paper is a survey of the literature on boards of directors, with an emphasis on research done subsequent to the Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) survey. The two questions most asked about boards are what determines their makeup and what determines their actions? These questions are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464161

Financial Expertise of Directors

Güner, A. Burak - 2006

The composition and functioning of corporate boards is at the core of the academic and policy debate on optimal corporate governance. But does board composition matter for corporate decisions? In this paper, we analyze the role of financial experts on boards. In a novel panel data set on board...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012466757

The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye - 2002

decisions, directors' superior information, bargaining by management, pressures on managers to focus on the short …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012469635

Throwing Good Money After Bad? Board Connections and Conflicts in Bank Lending

Kroszner, Randall S. - 2001

This paper investigates the frequency of connections between banks and non-financial firms through board linkages and whether those connections affect lending and borrowing behavior. Although a board linkages may reduce the costs of information flows between the lender and borrower, a board...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012470021

Busy Directors : Strategic Interaction and Monitoring Synergies

Ljungqvist, Alexander - 2017

We derive conditions for when having a "busy" director on the board is harmful to shareholders and when it is beneficial. Our model allows directors to condition their monitoring choices on their co-directors' choices and to experience positive or negative monitoring synergies across firms....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012453824

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