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Acemoglu, Daron - 1996

This paper offers and tests a theory of training whereby workers do not pay for general training they receive. The … other firms. This informational advantage gives the employer an ex post monopsony power over the worker which encourages the … high, and as a result employers have limited monopsony power and are willing to supply only little training, while in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012473240

Imperfect Labor Contracts and International Trade

Grossman, Gene M. - 1999

In an economy with imperfect labor contracts, differences in the distribution of human capital are an independent source of comparative advantage. I study a world economy with two sectors, one where output is produced by teams and another where individuals can work alone. When workers' abilities...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471910

Wage-Employment Contracts (Replaced by W0675)

Green, Jerry R. - 1981

This paper studies the efficient agreements about the dependence of workers' earnings on employment, when the employment level is controlled by firms. Under plausible assumptions, such agreements will cause employment to diverge from efficiency as a byproduct of their attempt to mitigate risk....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012478500

On the Role of Learning, Human Capital, and Performance Incentives for Wages

Camargo, Braz; Lange, Fabian; Pastorino, Elena - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2022

Performance pay in general amounts to only a small fraction of total pay. In this paper, we show that performance pay is nevertheless important for the level and dynamics of wages over the life cycle because of the incentives it indirectly provides for human capital acquisition and because of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013334409

Signaling and Employer Learning with Instruments

Aryal, Gaurab - 2019

The social and the private returns to education differ when education can increase productivity, and also be used to signal productivity. We show how instrumental variables can be used to separately identify and estimate the social and private returns to education within the employer learning...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012479834

Are Lemons Sold First? Dynamic Signaling in the Mortgage Market

Adelino, Manuel - 2018

A central result in the theory of adverse selection in asset markets is that informed sellers can signal quality and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012453533

The Insurance is the Lemon : Failing to Index Contracts

Hartman-Glaser, Barney - 2019

We model the widespread failure of contracts to share risk using available indices. A borrower and lender can share risk by conditioning repayments on an index. The lender has private information about the ability of this index to measure the true state that the borrower would like to hedge. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012479406

Contracts as Reference Points - Experimental Evidence

Fehr, Ernst - 2008

experimentally the behavioral forces stipulated in their theory. The evidence confirms the model's prediction that there is a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464146

Persistent Private Information

Williams, Noah - 2008

This paper studies the design of optimal contracts in dynamic environments where agents have private information that is persistent. In particular, I focus on a continuous time version of a benchmark insurance problem where a risk averse agent would like to borrow from a risk neutral lender to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464753

Asymmetric Learning in Repeated Contracting : An Empirical Study

Cohen, Alma - 2008

This paper studies a unique panel dataset of transactions with repeat customers of an insurer operating in a market in which insurers are not required by law or contract to share information about their customers' records. I use this dataset to test the asymmetric learning hypothesis that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464896

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