Macroprudential stress tests have been employed by regulators in the United States and Europe to assess and address the solvency condition of financial firms in adverse macroeconomic scenarios. We provide a test of these stress tests by comparing their risk assessments and outcomes to those from...

When a bank experiences a negative shock to its equity, one way to return to target leverage is to sell assets. If asset sales occur at depressed prices, then one bank's sales may impact other banks with common exposures, resulting in contagion. We propose a simple framework that accounts for...

We develop a model where institutions form connections through swaps of projects in order to diversify their individual risk. These connections lead to two different network structures. In a clustered network groups of financial institutions hold identical portfolios and default together. In an...

Over the last decade dealing in derivative financial instruments (basically forwards, futures, options and combinations of these), particularly in the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market has become a central activity for major wholesale banks and financial institutions. Measured in terms...

Gains and losses would be measured in terms of market value and also in terms of cash flow, allowing regulators to assess risk magnitudes in terms of stresses to both economic values and also liquidity. Exposures would be measured before and after collateralization. One of the scenarios would be...

In competitive capital markets, risky debt claims that offer high yields in good times have high systematic risk exposure in bad times. We apply this idea to bank risk measurement. We find that banks with high accounting return on equity (ROE) prior to a crisis have higher systematic tail risk...

We analyze the relationship between asset price bubbles and systemic risk, using bank-level data covering almost thirty years. Systemic risk of banks rises already during a bubble's build-up phase, and even more so during its bust. The increase differs strongly across banks and bubble episodes....

We employ a unique hand-collected dataset and a novel methodology to examine systemic risk before and after the largest U.S. banking crisis of the 20th century. Our systemic risk measure captures both the credit risk of an individual bank as well as a bank's position in the network. We construct...

Why did the failure of Lehman Brothers make the financial crisis dramatically worse? The financial crisis was a process of a build-up of risk during the crisis prior to the Lehman failure. Market participants tried to preserve an option or exit by shortening maturities - the "flight from...

We examine the evolution of real per capita GDP around 100 systemic banking crises. Part of the costs of these crises owes to the protracted nature of recovery. On average, it takes about eight years to reach the pre-crisis level of income; the median is about 6 ½ years. Five to six years after...