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CEO Compensation and Adverse Shocks : Evidence from Changes in Environmental Regulations
Choi, Seungho; Levine, Ross; Park, Jonghyeon; Xu, Simon - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2024
corporate boards to reduce the risk-taking incentives of CEO compensation. However, this pattern is not uniform. Financially … incentives with changing shareholder risk preferences …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014635626
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CEO Compensation and Cash-Flow Shocks : Evidence from Changes in Environmental Regulations
Choi, Seungho; Levine, Ross; Park, Jonghyeon; Xu, Simon - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2024
corporate boards to recalibrate CEO compensation to reduce risk-taking incentives. However, this pattern is not uniform … executive incentives with shareholder risk preferences following unanticipated changes in the stringency of environmental …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014486193
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Corporate Governance Implications of the Growth in Indexing
Brav, Alon; Malenko, Nadya; Malenko, Andrey - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2022
present a framework to understand the incentives of passive and actively managed funds to engage in governance, review the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013477210
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Executive Compensation : A Survey of Theory and Evidence
Edmans, Alex - 2017
of executive incentives. We compare pay in U.S. public firms to private and non-U.S. firms. We then critically analyze …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012455086
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Does Corporate Governance Matter in Competitive Industries?
Giroud, Xavier - 2009
By reducing the threat of a hostile takeover, business combination (BC) laws weaken corporate governance and increase the opportunity for managerial slack. Consistent with the notion that competition mitigates managerial slack, we find that while firms in non-competitive industries experience a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463770
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Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives
Anton, Miguel; Ederer, Florian; Giné, Mireia; Schmalz, … - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2022
We present a mechanism based on managerial incentives through which common ownership affects product market outcomes …. Firm-level variation in common ownership causes variation in managerial incentives and productivity across firms, which … and a difference-in-differences design we document that managerial incentives are less performance-sensitive in firms with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013477278
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Voting on Public Goods : Citizens vs. Shareholders
Döttling, Robin; Levit, Doron Y.; Malenko, Nadya; … - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2024
We study the interplay between a "one person-one vote" political system and a "one share-one vote" corporate governance regime. The political system sets Pigouvian subsidies, while corporate governance determines firm-specific public good investments. Our analysis highlights a two-way feedback...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014576634
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Shareholder Power and the Decline of Labor
Falato, Antonio; Kim, Hyunseob; Wachter, Till von - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2022
Shareholder power in the US grew over recent decades due to a steep rise in concentrated institutional ownership. Using establishment-level data from the US Census Bureau's Longitudinal Business Database for 1982-2015, this paper examines the impact of increases in concentrated institutional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013334421
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Information Flows, Organizational Structure, and Corporate Governance
Malenko, Nadya - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2023
) communication among shareholders and between shareholders and management in the context of shareholder activism. The goal of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014287310
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Pay for Short-Term Performance : Executive Compensation in Speculative Markets
Bolton, Patrick - 2006
We argue that the root cause behind the recent corporate scandals associated with CEO pay is the technology bubble of the latter half of the 1990s. Far from rejecting the optimal incentive contracting theory of executive compensation, the recent evidence on executive pay can be reconciled with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012466561