We show that a measure of reciprocity derived from the Berg et al. (1995) trust game in a laboratory setting predicts …

Tournaments, reward structures based on rank order, are compared with individual contracts in a model with one risk …-neutral principal and many risk-averse agents. Each agents' output is a stochastic function of his effort level plus an additive shock …

, can affect outcomes. We explore the economics of revealing type in a simple laboratory experiment to learn about the …

one mechanism yielding these dual patterns: false consensus. In the context of a trust game experiment, we show that …Trust beliefs are heterogeneous across individuals and, at the same time, persistent across generations. We investigate … individuals extrapolate from their own type when forming trust beliefs about the same pool of potential partners - i.e., more …

We analyze the contractual relation between workers and their employers when there is nominal risk. The key feature of … eliminate all nominal risk for the parties (by fully indexing the terms of the contracts to the price level) but they would be … re-negotiated. Foreseeing this, the parties to the contract will write one that is renegotiation-proof. Under such a …

private information and have the ability to contract on both realized revenue and drilling timing. We show that primary terms …

In a world of imperfect information, reputations often guide the sequential decisions to trust and to reward trust. We … consider two-player situations where the players meet but once. One player - the truster - decides whether to trust, and the … the number of black marks does not prolong trust beyond black marks alone. Finally, we consider more general summary …

This paper builds a theory of informal contract enforcement in social networks. In our model, relationships between …. We define trust between two agents as the maximum amount that one can borrow from the other, and derive a simple reduced … form expression for trust as a function of the social network. We show that trust is higher in more connected and more …

the interaction between majority and minority shareholders as a trust game in which the majority is constrained by the …