Showing 1 - 10 of 321
This paper examines managerial compensation in an environment where managers may take a hidden action that affects the … contract in this setting, and demonstrate that contracts contingent on reported earnings cannot provide managers with the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012466016
We argue that the root cause behind the recent corporate scandals associated with CEO pay is the technology bubble of the latter half of the 1990s. Far from rejecting the optimal incentive contracting theory of executive compensation, the recent evidence on executive pay can be reconciled with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012466561
incentive to induce managers to pursue actions which increase the speculative component in the stock price. Our model provides a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012468976
We examine how an increase in stock option grants affects CEO risk-taking. The overall net effect of option grants is theoretically ambiguous for risk-averse CEOs. To overcome the endogeneity of option grants, we exploit institutional features of multi-year compensation plans, which generate two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012455590
The dramatic rise in CEO compensation during the 1990s and early 2000s is a longstanding puzzle. In this paper, we show that much of the rise can be explained by a tendency of firms to grant the same number of options each year. Number-rigidity implies that the grant-date value of option awards...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012456699
This paper links the impending vesting of CEO equity to reductions in real investment. Existing studies measure the manager's short-term concerns using the sensitivity of his equity to the stock price. However, in myopia theories, the driver of short-termism is not the magnitude of incentives...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012459254
We show that firms with CEOs who personally benefitted from options backdating were more likely to engage in other forms of corporate misbehavior, suggestive of an unethical corporate culture. These firms were more likely to overstate firm profitability and to engage in less profitable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012459399
While prior empirical work and much public attention have focused on the opportunistic timing of executives' grants, we provide in this paper evidence that outside directors' option grants have also been favorably timed to an extent that cannot be fully explained by sheer luck. Examining events...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012465848
We study the relation between corporate governance and opportunistic timing of CEO option grants via backdating or otherwise. Our methodology focuses on how grant date prices rank within the price distribution of the grant month. During 1996-2005, about 12% of firms provided one or more lucky...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012465890
Managers appear to manipulate firm earnings when they characterize pension assets to capital markets and alter … earnings to the assumed long-term rate of return on pension assets. Managers are more aggressive with assumed long-term rates … of return when their assumptions have a greater impact on reported earnings. Managers also increase assumed rates of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012468150