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arise when monitoring corruption is difficult relative to monitoring the provision of public services, and politically …-important groups of citizens do not bear the full cost of corruption. The existence of such systems can distort the effective incidence … of the tax burden, reduce the incentives of government to fight corruption, and legitimize bribe-taking …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014421219
We approach the design of anti-discriminatory labor market regulation as a delegation problem. A private firm (the … their match with firm. A benevolent and unbiased labor market authority (the principal) enacts a hiring regulation (a direct …-revelation mechanism without transfers) in order to reduce the impact of the firm's bias on its hiring behavior. The hiring regulation is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014468218
We conduct parallel surveys of legislators and citizens in three countries to study their tolerance for corruption. In …-offs between, for example, probity and efficiency: both perceive corruption as undesirable but prevalent. These novel descriptive … data further reveal that legislators generally have accurate beliefs about public opinion on corruption and understand its …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015056149
When a firm forms a market closes. Resources that were previously allocated via the price system are allocated by managerial authority within the firm. We explore this choice of organizational form using a model of price formation in which agents negotiate prices on behalf of their principals...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471182
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012477157
Tournaments, reward structures based on rank order, are compared with individual contracts in a model with one risk-neutral principal and many risk-averse agents. Each agents' output is a stochastic function of his effort level plus an additive shock term that is common to all the agents. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012478271
In this paper, we examine the impact of pay-for-performance incentives on learning-by-doing. We exploit personnel data on fruit pickers paid under two distinct compensation contracts: a standard piece rate plan and a piece rate plan with an extra one-time bonus tied to output. Under the bonus...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012479749
We estimate the impact of venture capital (VC) contract terms on startup outcomes and the split of value between the entrepreneur and investor, accounting for endogenous selection via a novel dynamic search and matching model. The estimation uses a new, large data set of first financing rounds...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012480061
We study physician agency and optimal payment policy in the context of an expensive medication used in dialysis care. Using Medicare claims data we estimate a structural model of treatment decisions, in which physicians differ in their altruism and marginal costs, and this heterogeneity is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012481755
Commitment is therefore more valuable when quality is known more precisely. Incentives then are easier to provide because the agent has less room to manipulate the beliefs of the principal. Moreover, in contrast to results under one-period commitment, wage volatility declines as experience...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012462007