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Performance Incentives Within Firms : The Effect of Managerial Responsibility
Aggarwal, Rajesh K. - 1999
executive officers. However, firms are run by teams of managers, and a theory of the firm should also explain the distribution …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471450
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Executive Compensation : Six Questions that Need Answering
Abowd, John M. - 1999
In this article, we focus on how recent research advances can be used to address the following six questions: (1) How much does executive compensation cost the firm? (2) How much is executive compensation worth to the recipient? (3) How well does executive compensation work? (4) What are the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471670
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Valuing the Reload Features of Executive Stock Options
Huddart, Steven - 1999
Under Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123, the grant date value of executive stock options excludes the value of any reload feature because, at the time of writing the standard in 1995, the Financial Accounting Standards Board believed it was not feasible to value a reload...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471780
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CEO Compensation
Frydman, Carola - 2010
result of powerful managers setting their own pay. Others interpret high pay as the result of optimal contracting in a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012462072
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Executive Compensation : Facts
Clementi, Gian Luca - 2009
In this paper we describe the important features of executive compensation in the US from 1993 to 2006. Some confirm what has been found for earlier periods and some are novel. Important facts about compensation are that: the compensation distribution is highly skewed; each year, a sizeable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463223
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Stock-Based Compensation and CEO (Dis)Incentives
Benmelech, Efraim - 2008
Stock-based compensation is the standard solution to agency problems between shareholders and managers. In a dynamic … managers to work harder, it also induces them to hide any worsening of the firm's investment opportunities by following largely …-valued while managers hide the bad news to shareholders. We find that a firm-specific compensation package based on both stock and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464915
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The Economics of Earnings Manipulation and Managerial Compensation
Crocker, Keith J. - 2006
This paper examines managerial compensation in an environment where managers may take a hidden action that affects the … contract in this setting, and demonstrate that contracts contingent on reported earnings cannot provide managers with the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012466016
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Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?
Gabaix, Xavier - 2006
This paper develops a simple equilibrium model of CEO pay. CEOs have different talents and are matched to firms in a competitive assignment model. In market equilibrium, a CEO's pay changes one for one with aggregate firm size, while changing much less with the size of his own firm. The model...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012466300
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Pay for Short-Term Performance : Executive Compensation in Speculative Markets
Bolton, Patrick - 2006
We argue that the root cause behind the recent corporate scandals associated with CEO pay is the technology bubble of the latter half of the 1990s. Far from rejecting the optimal incentive contracting theory of executive compensation, the recent evidence on executive pay can be reconciled with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012466561
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Firm Expansion and CEO Pay
Bebchuk, Lucian - 2005
We study the extent to which decisions to expand firm size are associated with increases in subsequent CEO compensation. Controlling for past stock performance, we find a positive correlation between CEO compensation and the CEO's past decisions to increase firm size. This correlation is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012466785