-institution risk-shifting in recent years. Our method traverses two steps. The first step estimates leverage, return volatility, and …

in the depth and breadth of capital markets can be explained by a combination of the existence of deposit insurance and … empirical evidence showing that countries with explicit deposit insurance and a high degree of state-owned bank assets have …

This paper studies the optimal determination of deposit insurance when bank runs are possible. We show that the welfare … impact of changes in the level of deposit insurance coverage can be generally expressed in terms of a small number of …

Hooks and Robinson argue that moral hazard induced by deposit insurance induced banks to invest in riskier assets in … officers, which increases when insurance reduces depositors' incentives to monitor and react to the safety and soundness of …

Eight states established deposit insurance systems between 1908 and 1917. All abandoned the systems between 1921 and … Reserve Board of Governors demonstrate that deposit insurance influenced the composition of bank suspensions in these states …

trade off between risk and return. Banks may mitigate the resultant excessive risk by costly monitoring, where greater risk … reduction requires more resources devoted to risk supervision. Hence, the excessive risk associated with moral hazard is … endogenously determined. We show that a drop in banks' cost of funds increases the risk tolerated by banks in a competitive …

centers on fixed-rate deposit insurance: the insurance gives bank shareholders an incentive to take on risk when the value of … managerial entrenchment, more than moral hazard associated with deposit insurance, explains the recent behavior of the banking …

worsen, debt induces firms to risk-shift; this limits their funding liquidity and their ability to roll over debt. Firms may …