We extend the concept of competitive search equilibrium to environments with private information, and in particular adverse selection. Principals (e.g. employers or agents who want to buy assets) post contracts, which we model as revelation mechanisms. Agents (e.g. workers, or asset holders)...

We incorporate a search-theoretic model of imperfect competition into an otherwise standard model of asymmetric information with unrestricted contracts. We develop a methodology that allows for a sharp analytical characterization of the unique equilibrium, and then use this characterization to...

We study optimal tax policy in a dynamic private information economy with endogenous private markets. We characterize efficient allocations and competitive equilibria. A standard assumption in the literature is that trades are observable by all agents. We show that in such an environment the...

This paper uses an asymmetric information framework to understand the causes of the recent financial crisis in Korea. It shows that the Korean data is consistent with this explanation of the crisis. It then draws on this analysis to discuss several lessons that can help guide Korean policymakers...

This article describes the anatomy of health insurance. It begins by considering the optimal design of health insurance policies. Such policies must make tradeoffs appropriately between risk sharing on the one hand and agency problems such as moral hazard (the incentive of people to seek more...

This paper presents new evidence on the importance of adverse selection in individual annuity markets. It focuses on the individual annuity market in the United Kingdom, which provides an excellent empirical setting for studying selection effects. In addition to a voluntary annuity market, the...

A new form of lending using digital collateral has recently emerged, most prominently in low and middle income countries. Digital collateral (DC) relies on "lockout" technology, which allows the lender to temporarily disable the low value of the collateral to the borrower without physically...

In the United States, households obtain health insurance through distinct market segments. We explore the economics of this segmentation by comparing coverage provided through small employers versus the individual marketplace. Using data from Oregon, we find households with group coverage spend...

We present both theory and evidence that increased competition may decrease rather than increase consumer welfare in subprime credit markets. We present a model of lending markets with imperfect competition, adverse selection and costly lender screening. In more competitive markets, lenders have...

We study how inertia interacts with market power and adverse selection in managed competition health insurance markets. We use consumer-level data to estimate a model of the California ACA exchange, in which four firms dominate the market and risk adjustment is in place to manage selection. We...